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NOTES
in the reports of the higher state courts since the National Reporter
System began and of the lower state courts both before and after the
National Reporter System. Many law reviews and other legal periodicals would be valuable additions to the library and so would certain
texts and treatises. For example, the library recently tried to buy a
replacement copy of volume one of Tiffany's Landlord and Tenant,
only to find it unavailable from the publisher and leading second hand
dealers.
If any reader would like to clear his office and home of legal material no longer of use to him and send it to the Law Library, University
of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana, the library will be glad to pay
the carriage costs.
J.H.M.

NOTES
DAMAGES RECOVERABLE FOR THE INFRINGEMENT OF A COPYRIGHT.-

Where the work of a copyright proprietor has been infringed, his remedies under the present Copyright Act have been classified' as 1. Recovery of the profits made by the infringer; 2. Recovery of the actual
damages in addition to such profits; and 3. Recovery in lieu of profits
and actual damages, but not by way of penalty, designated sums within a minimum - maximum schedule. This paper concerns the recovery
of damages, as distinguished from the profits realized by the infringer,
whether they be actual damages or those recoverable solely by virtue
of statutory provision.
HistoricalBackground -

The Common Law Copyright

Although the primary justification set forth by the courts in creating the so-called common law copyright was a recognition of the
property right of the creator and the monetary return that might thereby
accrue to him, an equally important basis was that of encouraging intellectual labor and thereby securing to society the beneficial products
that might result.2 This twofold reason underlying the social interest
in copyright was recognized in the Federal Constitution wherein it
was provided that:
"The Congress shall have power s...

To promote the Progress

of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries." 4
1 Wel on Copyright.
2 AN ENCYcLOPEDTA oF THE SocrAL ScIENCEs, Copyright, p. 401 (1930).
3 U. S. CoNsT., Art I, § 8.
4 U. S. CONST., Art. I, § 8 (8).
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And the court decisions that followed, though using varying and different phraseology, reiterated this social interest as the reason supporting the principle. 5 However comprehensive the law on this subject is
today, it must be remembered that, as was the case with other phases
of the law, it represents the imperceptible accretion over the years
of the usage and interest of society in the intellectual labor of its
members. And to correctly understand and estimate the importance
of present statutory provisions it is necessary to examine the beginning - the common law copyright - and what influence, if any, it
has at the present day.
At the outset it should be noticed that the common law copyright
still exists independent of statute and is an actual and independent
right, irrespective of whether statutory protection has been applied for.
It "entitles the proprietor thereof to the exclusive use of the production
before publication and the exclusive right to copy the production until
he permits a general publication." 6 Also defined as the right of first
publication, 7 it is an absolute property right capable of being transferred and recognizable as such where infringement or interference is
threatened.8 However, the right itself must be distinguished from the
material object which is the subject of the right. As was pointed out
in a very recent case, 9 "It is an intangible, incorporeal right in the nature of a privilege or franchise quite independent of any material
substance such as the manuscript or the plates used for printing." And
Judge Drummond speaking as early as 1870 stated that common law
copyrights exist independent of any notwithstanding statutory enactments:
"The author of any literary or dramatic work is the sole
proprietor of the manuscript and its contents and of copies of the
same independent of legislation, so long as he does not publish
it or part with the right of property. This is called a common
law right and exists irrespective of copyright statutes." 10
It is in the nature of common law copyright that it can exist only
in manuscripts and other unpublished works."
But it is a different
and independent right from that of ownership in an article of personal
5 "The law undertakes to encourage the publication of works of this character." Wermmeister v. Springer Lithographing Co., 63 Fed. 808, 810 (C. C. S. D.

1894).
6

34 Am. JUR., LITERARY PROPERTY AND COPYRIGHT, § 10.

7 Jewelers Mercantile Agency v. Jewelers Weekly Publishing Co., 155 N. Y.
241, 49 N. E. 872 (1898).
8 Crowe v. Aiken, 2

Biss. 208, 6 Fed. Cas. 904, No. 3,441 (N. D. Ill. 1870).
9 Remick Music Corp. v. Interstate Hotel Co. of Nebraska, 58 F. Supp.

523, 542 (D. Neb. 1944).
10 Crowe v. Aiken, 2 Biss. 208, 6 Fed. Cas. 904, 905, No. 3,441 (N. D. Ill.

1870).
11

AMDUR,

COPYRIGHT LAW AND

PRACTICE,

§ 35

(1936).
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property, 12 being in the nature of a privilege or franchise as heretofore noted. Though the common law and the statutory copyright
cannot co-exist,' 8 it does not necessarily follow that by the enactment
of statutory provision that the rights incident to and characteristic
of the common law copyright are thereby extinguished. They continue to exist independent of all statutory enactments and have been
recognized and excepted from the operation of the federal act by a
specific reference therein. 14 The reason underlying this mutual exclusiveness can best be appreciated by recourse to a definition of terms.
Thus the common law copyright has been termed "copyright before
publication" 15 and is the exclusive right of first publishing any original material product of intellectual labor. On the other hand, statutory copyright has been defined as "copyright after publication" "I
and is the right to multiply copies of a literary work to the exclusion
of others 17 and exists only by reason of specific statutory enactments.
It is designed to protect the producer who complies with the mandatory
requirements of the act. In return, although the common law right is
thereby extinguished, he acquires a sort of monopoly 18 for a limited
period. A new and totally different property right is thereby effected
and protected even after general publication, which publication would
have obviated any further protection under the doctrine of common
law copyright. Without further elaboration it can be seen that an
abortive attempt to secure a statutory copyright may in some cases
destroy all rights under the common law theory, and thus leave the
proprietor remediless. The determining factor in such a situation is
what constitutes a publication. In Jewelers Mercantile Agency v.
Jewelers Weekly Publishing Co.19 it was held that the mere deposit of
two copies of the manuscript with the Librarian of Congress as required
by statute would constitute a publication thereof, irrespective of whether
or not a copyright was secured, and destroyed all rights incident to the
copyright at common law. However, in a very early case 20 it was
held that the filing of a copy of the title page of a drama manuscript
preparatory to obtaining a copyright was not such a publication as
would cause the author to lose his common law rights and thereby
serve as a dedication of his work to the public.
12 Pushman v. New York Graphic Society, 287 N. Y. 302, 39 N. E. (2d)
249 (1942).
13 Caliga v. Inter Ocean Newspaper Co., 215 U. S.182, 54 L.Ed. 150 (1909).
14 17 U. S. C. A., § 2.
15 Palmer v. DeWitt, 47 N. Y. 532, 537, 7 Am. Rep. 480, 482 (1872).
I' Palmer v. DeWitt, 47 N. Y. 532, 537, 7 Am. Rep. 480, 482 (1872).
17 Palmer v. DeWitt, 47 N. Y. 532, 536, 7 Am. Rep. 480, 482 (1872).
18 Hoague-Sprague Corp. v. Frank C. Meyer Co., Inc., 27 Fed. (2d) 176
(E. 1. N. Y. 1928).
19 155 N. Y. 241, 49 N. E. 872 (1898).
20 Jones v. Thorne, 1 N. Y. Legal Obs. 408 (1843).
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Having ascertained the existence of the exclusive right in a manuscript prior to publication, our next consideration is how far and in
what manner will the courts protect this common law right? That
there is liability in damages for any unwarranted interference or infringement is uncontroverted, but the authorities are by no means
agreed as to the correct measure to apply. Generally it may be said
that:
"There is little authority on the question of the amount of
damages recoverable in cases of invasion of common law rights in
literary property. Determination of the amount seems to lie in
the discretion of the jury upon consideration of the facts of the
case, and the fundamental rule of awarding a fair compensation
and indemnity for loss, apparently is applied." 21
The measure applied by the courts varies with the factual situation
and apparently is adapted to meet the exigencies of each individual
case. Thus where a carrier lost the baggage of one of its passengers
which included an unpublished manuscript, the court though making
no specific reference to the doctrine of common law copyright, recognized the manuscript as a thing of value, the exclusive property right
which was vested in the party damaged. Therefore recovery was
allowed, the measure being the cost of reproduction. 22 And where a
manufacturer used ideas submitted at his request by an advertising
agency but refused payment, the court applied the measure as being
the value of the use of the idea to the infringing party, 23 stating that

even though the ideas were submitted for consideration, there was, nevertheless, not such a publication as would defeat the common law right to
first publication and so would not excuse subsequent use without permission or preclude liability therefor. So also in the case of State v.
State Journal Co. 24 where the court, though refusing to predicate liability upon the grounds of an infringement of a common law copyright, nevertheless reached the same result by applying the value of
the use measure and stating that should the use amount to a conversion
then the measure would be the value of the property itself and not
merely the value of the use thereof. Where, however, there has been
a wanton and malicious disregard of the author's rights as was the
case in Press Publishing Co. v. Monroe 25 and an infringement is
knowingly and wilfully made, exemplary damages will be awarded and
such award is not dependent upon the proof of actual pecuniary damage.
In that case the author sold an ode she had composed for use in the
dedicatory exercises at the World's Fair, reserving the copyright until
21
22
23

34 Am. JuR., Li:TERARv NoERTY

m

COPYRIGHT, § 23.

Wood v. Cunard Steamship Co., Ltd., 192 Fed. 293 (C. C. A. 2d, 1911).

Ryan and Assoc. v. Century Brewing Assn., 185 Wash. 600, 55 P. (2d)

1053 (1936).

24

75 Neb. 275, 106 N. W. 434 (1905).

25

73 Fed. 196 (C. C. A. 2d, 1896).
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a publication should be made in any one of a specified number of
ways. Defendant newspaper published it without her permission after
she had delivered it, though notified by their Chicago correspondent
that it was copyrighted. The court in determining whether a common
law copyright still existed said: "A reservation by the author 'subject to the concession herein made . . . of her copyright in the poem',

imports a reservation of common law as well as statutory copyright." 28
Relief can be procured by way of damages then, though different measures are applied. But what of the cases wherein it is impossible to
prove actual pecuniary loss - what relief will the courts then afford?
Should the interference be a threatened one and not actually inflicted, recourse may be had to equity. Thus Pomeroy says:
"A jurisdiction has become well established by modem decisions
to restrain the invasion or piracy of literary property in the
product of intellectual labor, which still remains in the form of
manuscript, or which, if printed, has not been published, and
over which, as a consequence, no statutory copyright has been
obtained." 27
Of course the injunction is also available after infringements and damages resulting therefrom. But to all intents and purposes there is no
remedy whereby a recovery may be had for the pecuniary loss previously
sustained by reason of the infringement already committed. However,
it has been held that where an unlawful use can be shown, a court of
equity is authorized to grant an order for an accounting as well as
an injunction.2 8 But this is adequate only where the profits actually
realized from the infringement coincide with the damage inflicted. It
is inconceivable that such a state of equilibrium will ever be reached.
On the other hand, no recovery could be had under this theory where
there was an infringement but no profits were made. To correct these
manifest inequities, something in addition to the common law remedies
was necessary.
Statutory Modification
At the common law, no relief was forthcoming in the absence of
proof of actual damages inflicted. This defect was recognized at a
very early date and statutes enacted in an attempt to rectify it. These
statutes, however, were not in derogation of the common law copyright
but were supplementary thereto and also afforded some protection to
the copyright proprietor after publication had been made, provided of
course that certain conditions precedent had been fulfilled. The historical basis for these statutes might be summarized as:
26

Id. at 198.

27

Pom Roy, EQUIZY JURISpRUDENCE

28

(4th Ed. 1919).
French v. Kreling, 63 Fed. 621 (N. D. Cal. 1894).
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"The right of an author, irrespective of statute, to his own
productions and to a control of their publication, seems to have
been recognized by the common law but to have been so ill-defined
that from an early period legislation was adopted to regulate and
limit such right." 29
Such regulation of the common law right secured three heretofore unrealized advantages - rights after publication, award of damages where
no actual damages could be shown to exist, and remedies for infringement. Until the passage of these statutes comprising the various Copyright Acts none of these benefits were obtainable, either because of the
absence of such specific provisions at the common law or because the
peculiar circumstances of the case were inadmissible as evidence.
These statutory modifications were not a continuation. of the common
law right, however. They were a new, severable, and distinct right
created by Congress in conformity with the provisions of the Federal
Constitution. 30 This distinction was recognized in an early Supreme
Court case wherein it was pointed out:
"That an author at common law has a property in his manuscript, and may obtain redress against any one who endeavors to
realize a profit by its publication cannot be doubted; but this is a
very different right from that which asserts a perpetual and exclusive property in the future publication of the work, after the
author shall have published it to the world." 31
These same principles were reiterated in a later Supreme Court case
wherein the court sought to clarify the impression that the Copyright
Act superseded the common law right by declaring:
"The contention of the plaintiff in error that the passage by
Congress of the copyright statutes has abrogated the common law
right of an author to his manuscript is unsupported by authority."
These statutes secure and regulate the exclusive property in the
future publication of the work after the author shall have published it to the world. "But this is a very different right from the
ownership and control before publication." 32
The property right of exclusive use before publication, then, will be
protected independent of and notwithstanding the copyright statutes.33
The point of departure, then, is the divestiture of the common law right
and the substitution therefor of the common law copyright as well as
correcting the discrepancies that existed therein. As was said in
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus: 84
Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U. S. 82, 84, 43 L. Ed. 904, 905 (1899).
30 U. S. CoNsr., Art. I, § 8.
31 Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591, 657, 8 L. Ed. 1055, 1079 (1834).
32 Press Pub. Co. v. Monroe, 73 Fed. 196 (C. C. A. 2d, 1896).
33 French v. McGuire, 55 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 471 (1878).
29
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"The surrender of the perpetual right (of property under the
doctrine of common law copyright) is a condition precedent to the
enjoyment of statutory copyright. The common law right is lost
by the general publication or unrestricted sale of a single copy.
The statute protects the owner in the unrestricted publication and
sale of all copies during the term of the copyright. The right to
copyright which exists at common law, has been superseded by
statute. Where the owner of the common law copyright elects to
substitute the protection of the statute for that of the common
law, he, upon publication, abandons or surrenders his common law
rights2 including said right of limited publication, in exchange for
the statutory right, the exclusive right to multiply copies. He
cannot have at the same time his benefit of the copyright statute
and also retain his common law right. No proposition is better
settled than that a statutory copyright operates to divest a party
of the common law right."
With this background we can now proceed to a consideration of the
terms of the statute, its interpretation, and the difference in protection
afforded the author under the code as compared to the meager protection which we have seen is available at the common law.
In determining what effect and interpretation shall be given the
express terms of the statute, recourse must be had to legislative intent.
Judicial determination of this intent in the application of the provisions of a statute to a given case is a cardinal rule of statutory construction.3 5 What then, was the purpose of Congress in passing the
Copyright Act? As was succinctly stated in a recent Federal case: 36
"The Copyright Statute, 17 U. S. C. A. section 1 et seq., was
enacted for the protection of property rights and not for the purpose of providing a means by which a penalty could be collected
in the nature of damages."
As to what effect should therefore be given its provisions, the statement made by Justice Day in the early case of American Tobacco Co.
v. Werckmeister 87 has been, and still is, quoted as paramount authority:
84 147 Fed. 15, 19 (C. C. A. 2d, 1906); afrmed 210 U. S. 339, 52 L. td.
1086 (1908); 52 Fed. 1086 (1908) citing DRoNE ON COPYRIGHT at page 346; "As
the law is now expounded, there are important differences between the statutory
and the common law right. The former exists only in works which have been
published within the meaning of the statute, and the latter only in works which
have not been so published. In the former case, ownership is limited to a term
of years; in the latter, it is perpetual. The rights do not co-exist in the same
composition; when the statutory right begins, the common law right ends. Both
may be defeated by publication. Thus, when a work is published in print, the
owner's common law rights are lost and, unless the publication be in accordance
with the requirements of the statute, the statutory right is not secured."
35 2 SUHE~ AND, STATUTORY CoNsTmUCIoN (3rd Ed. 1943) 176.
86
87

Norm Co. v. John A. Brown Co., 26 F. Supp. 707, 710 (W. D. Okla. 1939).
207 U. S. 284, 291, 52 L. Ed. 208, 214 (1907).
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"Under this grant of authority (as contained in the provisions
of the Federal Constitution) 38 a series of statutes have been
passed, having for their object the protection of the property
which the author has in the right to publish his production, the
purpose of the statute being to protect this right in such manner
that the author may have the benefit of this property for a limited
term of years. These statutes should be given a fair and reasonable construction with a view to effecting such purpose."
In applying these tests of purpose and construction to the Copyright Act, recourse must be had not only to that section dealing with
damages recoverable but also to those parts of the Act which define
and limit the interferences constituting damage. Before the measure
of damages may be ascertained, the question of what is damage under
the Copyright Act must be resolved. Section 25 provides the penalties
that will be assessed, "If any person shall infringe the copyright in any
work protected under the copyright laws of the United States." 39
Answering the question, what is infringement, then, is tantamount to
determining what constitutes damage under the Copyright Act.
Infringement
The word "infringe" is derived from the Latin infringere, meaning
to break. Bouvier 40 defines an infringement as:
"A word used to denote the act of trespassing upon the incorporeal right secured by a patent or copyright ... for which damages may be recovered at law by an action on the case, or which
may be remedied by a bill in equity for an injunction and an account."
Thus the Latin source, in addition to defining in a general way the
nature of the interference also prescribes the remedy because an action
of trespass on the case is one wherein there has been a breaking and
entering upon the possession of another with results in an indirect as
distinguished from an immediate and direct injury. In the case of
Copyright, that right of possession, depending upon whether it was common law or statutory copyright, would be the exclusive right of the
proprietor to the product of his labors, and, the interference though
working no immediate ascertainable injury, mighti ,mpair future earnings and profits by reason of the unauthorized publication.
Although numerous cases 41 have reiterated the principle that there
is no distinction between an infringement at common law and under
the copyright statute, nevertheless the problem is somewhat complicated
38

39
40
41

U. S. CoNsT., Art I, § 8.
17 U. S. C. A., § 25.
Bouv=Rm's LAW DicTIONARY, Rawle's Third Revision (1914).
Notes (
) 51 L. R. A. 278.

NOTES*
by continued references to "infringement" in the specific wording of
the present Act, 42 but with no specific definition of the term therein.
The English Act

43

on the other hand provides that:

"Copyright in any work shall be deemed to be infringed by
any person who, without the consent of the owner of the copyright
does anything the sole right to do which is by this act conferred
on the owner of the copyright."
In spite of the absence of an express definition in the American Statute,
a perusal of the Act as a whole indicates that a definition of a sort
can be dissected therefrom. As to the process to be followed in achieving this desirable result, attention should first of all be called to the
initial sentence of the Statute: 44 "Any person entitled thereto, upon
complying with the provisions of this title, shall have the exclusive
right:" 45 Thereupon are listed the specific rights protected by the
statute. By implication, therefore, it may be concluded that any action in derogation of the provisions shall constitute an infringement.
That such was in the contemplation of Congress when the statute was
enacted can be determined from the provisions of the Act which are
there set out, providing for specific relief where the provisions of the
Act are disregarded. 4 6 This is also readily discernible from the fact
that no definition as such was incorporated into the otherwise comprehensive provisions of the Act, thus evidencing the intention of Congress that the construction as herein made should control.
What the statutes assume in a general way, the established decisions
interpret to a point beyond which further refinement is unnecessary.
Thus it has been held that the intention to infringe is not an essential
attribute of the offense. 47 Once the fact of infringement has been
established a cause of action is presented because the intent to infringe is immaterial. 48 The result and not the intention at the time
the deed was done controls. 49 As was said in a recent Federal caser 0
"Assuming that the defendant did not intend to infringe, the lack of
intention does not affect the fact of liability. The result and not the
intention determine the question of infringement." How great an
invasion of the rights of another must it be to constitute an infringement? It has been decided that substantial portions of the copyrighted
matter must be appropriated so that it definitely appears that the
17U. S.C.A.,§ 1 etseq.
Fenning Film Service v. Wolverhampton, Walsall, and District Cinemas
(1914) 3 K. B. 11-71.
42
48

44

17 U. S. C.A.§1

Italics those of this writer.
17U. S.C.A.§ 25.
47 Chappell & Co., Inc., v. Costa, 45 F. Supp. 5$4 (S. D. N. Y. 1942).
48 Sammons v. Larkin, 38 F. Supp. 649 (D. Mass. 1940).
49 Lawrence v. Dana, 15 Fed. Cas. 26, No. 8,136 (D. Mass. 1869).
50 M. Witmark & Sons v. Calloway, 22 F. (2d) 412, 414 (E. D. Tenn. 1927).
45
46
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work of the proprietor has been used. 51 It is that conduct, "whether
being one act or many, which constitutes a connected and fairly unitary
invasion of the proprietor's rights." 52
Insofar as actual copying is concerned, there again it must be substantial even though it constitutes but a small portion of the entire
work. 53 A quite recent decision interpreted copying as being something more than merely transcribing from one work to another:
"Copying is not confined to a literary repetition, but includes
various modes in which the matter of any publication may be
adapted, colorable alteration." 54
In that case a lecturer appropriated to his own use a manner of presentation and a combination of ideas on the subject of memory aids
and the court decided that this constituted copying sufficient to justify
a finding of infringement. Inasmuch as an exact copying is not
essential, it would seem logical that paraphrasing would also constitute an infringement. And it has been so held. 55 Similarly, the
playing of musical compositions- without the consent of the copyright
holders is an infringement, 56 coming within the provisions of section 1
of the Act .57 And the fact that the presence of the orchestra is merely
incidental to the main purpose for which the business is conducted
is beside the point for it has been definitely stated that, "Whether
it pays or not, the purpose of employing it is profit, and that is
enough." 58 From the foregoing, it can be seen that the infringement
of a copyright is an actionable wrong - a tort 59 - the burden of
proof of which is on the party seeking to establish the fact of infringement -

the party plaintiff.

Various tests have been formulated to determine whether the facts
of a particular case constitute an infringement. Thus there is no
liability unless "the whole or a part of the copyrighted work has been
copied, either in haec verba or by colorable variation." 80 Or, as was
said in the case of Simonton v. Gordon: 61
51
52

Roe-Lawton v. Hal E. Roach Studios, 18 F. (2d) 126 (S. D. Cal. 1927).
Westermann Co. v. Dispatch Printing Co., 233 Fed. 609, 615 (C. C. A.

6th, 1916).

58 Towle v. Ross, 32 F. Supp. 125 (D. Ore. 1940).
54
(C. C.
55
56

Nutt v. Nat'l Institute for Improvement of Memory, 31 F. (2d) 236, 238
A. 2d, 1929).
Borden v. General Motors Corp., 28 F. Supp. 330 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
Buck v. Dacer, 26 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1938).
57 17 U. S. C. A. § 1 - giving the exclusive right "To perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit if it be a musical composition."
58 Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U. S. 591, 595, 61 L. Ed. 511, 514 (1916).
59 Frankel v. Irwin, 34 Fed. (2d) 142 (S. D. N. Y. 1918).
00 Edward Thompson Co. v. American Law Book Co., 122 Fed. 922, 923
(C. C. A. 2d, 1903).
61 12 F. (2d) 116, 124 (S. D. N. Y. 1925).
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"Whether the similarities existing . . .are mere coincidences
arising because of the development . ..of a central idea taken
from a common source, or whether these similarities are such as
to... reveal plagiarism, and further, if there was not piracy, was
there such an unintentional infringement of complainant's copyright as to justify the equitable relief which complainant seeks?"
Mere likeness, then, is not the real test, rather, "The finding that the
second 'work' is not an original treatment of a subject open alike to
treatment by both, but is a copy more or less servile of the first." 62
Where it requires "dissection rather than observation to discern any
resemblance," 6s there is no infringement. To apply such a test would
engraft too rigorous a restriction upon the author and would serve to
permit the copyrighting of what has been recognized as the common
source. Substantial appropriation to that -extent, then, is not enough.
Capability of apprehension by the so-called reasonable man is in addition necessary-64
Before leaving the question as to what constitutes an infringement,
a reference in passing should be made to -the question of what constitutes a subsequent infringement. Although the topic will be considered more fully under the damages section of this paper, there is
one phase of the problem that is more closely related to what constitutes infringement than to what damages to assess, For as we have
seen, in order to have any measure of damages we must first of all
ascertain if there has been an infringement. The chief diversity of
judicial opinion has centered around the field of radio and the specific
question as to whether or not rebroadcast constitutes any infringement.
The divergence of judicial opinion on this subject is probably attributable to the comparative ignorance of all save experts as to what
the technicalities of radio were and just what was involved in the process of broadcasting and subsequent reception. Nor was there a keen
appreciation of the possibilities of radio and the manifold and varied
uses to which it could be put. Consequently, the dangers and extent
of infringements of copyrights were not too readily perceived nor
could the extent of the influence of radio in future years be readily
estimated. Thus in an early Missouri case 65 the court held that a
hotel proprietor in receiving a radio broadcast on a master set and
subsequently disseminating it throughout the hotel, both to its public
and private rooms, did not infringe the proprietor's copyright because:
"The waves thrown out upon the ether are not a record of the
original performance. They are the original performance. Their
62 Pellegrini v. Aflegrini, 2 F. (2d) 610, 612 (E. D. Pa. 1924).
63

Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F. (2d) 690, 692 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926).

64 Arnstein v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 137 F. (2d) 410 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943).
65 Buck v. Duncan, 32 F. (2d) 366, 367 (W. D. Mo. 1929).
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reception is not a reproduction but a hearing, of the original performance. The reception of a musical composition on a radio
receiver is not a performance at all."
In that case, the radio studio was not licensed to broadcast the infringing composition and the only question was as to how far the
liability should extend. But in a California case e6 decided at about
the same time, the court said that the fact of the studio being licensed
to broadcast the composition would preclude recovery against a cafe
proprietor who received and disseminated the program to his guests,
because the copyright proprietor by licensing the broadcasting station,
"impliedly sanctioned and consented to any 'pick-up' out of the air
that was possible in radio reception." These two cases illustrate the
earlier view as enunciated by the Federal District Courts.
As evidence of the fact that there did not exist equanimity of judicial opinion on this controversial subject is the case of Buck v.
Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 6 7 a Supreme Court decision which was an
appeal of the Missouri case cited above and in which the decision of
the District Court was reversed. In concluding that the rebroadcast
was such a reproduction as would justify an award of damages where
a copyright was thereby infringed, the court distinguished between a
hearing and a reproduction so that a hearing could be effectuated:
"We are satisfied that the reception of a radio broadcast and
its translation into audible sound is not a mere audition of the
original program. It is essentially a reproduction. As to the
general theory of radio transmission there is no disagreement. All
sounds consist of waves of relatively low frequencies which ordinarily pass through the air and are locally audible. Thus music
played at a distant broadcasting studio is not directly heard at
the receiving set. In the microphone of the radio transmitter the
sound waves are used to modulate electrical currents of relatively
high frequencies which are broadcast through an entirely different
medium, conventionally known as the 'ether.' These radio waves
are not audible. In the receiving set they are rectified; that is,
converted into direct currents which actuate the loud speaker to
produce again in the air sound waves of audible frequencies. The
modulation of the radio waves in the transmitting apparatus, by
the audible sound waves is comparable to the manner in which
the wax phonograph record is impressed by the same waves through
the medium of a recording stylus. The transmitted radio waves
require a receiving set for their detection and translation into
audible sound waves, just as the record requires another mechanism
for the reproduction of the recorded proposition. In neither case
is the original program heard; and, in the former, complicated
66
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electrical instrumentalities are necessary for its adequate reception
and distribution. Reproduction in both cases amounts to a performance."
And the fact that the broadcasting station has a license to perform
does not enable the receiver to disseminate the composition for the
public and for profit, it being held 68 that "there is not any privity
whatever between the broadcaster and the receiver" and so the question of infringement "Depends not on the broadcaster's rights but the
receiver's rights." 69 In construing the license as one solely for the
performance given by the broadcasting company, the court dissipated
the theory of such an act impliedly sanctioning a "pick-up" of the performance by all capable of doing so and using it as they saw fit. Such
is the law as to rebroadcast constituting infringement as it exists today.
Damages
As we have already noticed, the shortcomings of the common law
in protecting the copyright proprietor against infringements and in
assessing damages for pecuniary loss actually proved, led to the enactment of statutory provisions to remedy these defects as well as
to provide further incentive to the exercise of creative genius by securing exclusive rights after publication. As one authority on the subject
has said:
"The sole justification for these statutory damages . . . is that
they deter wilful infringements and to some extent compensate
the copyright owner for his considerable expense in investigating,
prosecuting, and protecting his copyright." 70
It might be added that such compensation entails the award of damages,
though actual, non-provable, at the common law.
That part of the Act 71 which remedies these short-comings of the
common law by allowing the so-called statutory damages specifically
provides:
"If any person shall infringe the copyright in any work protected under the copyright laws of the United States, such person
shall be liable: ...
"To pay to the copyright proprietor such damages as the copyright proprietor may have suffered due to the infringement, . . .
or in lieu of actual damages and profits, such damages as to the
68 Society of European Stage, Authors and Composers, Inc., v. Hotel Statler,
19 F. Supp. 1, 6 (S. D. N. Y. 1937). 69 Society of European Stage, Authors and Composers, Inc. v. Hotel Statler,
19 F. Supp. 1, 6 (S. D. N. Y. 1937).
70 Shafter, Musical Copyright, 306 (2d Ed. 1939).
71 17 U. S. C. A. § 25.
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court shall appear just, and in assessing such damages the court
may, in its discretion, allow the amounts as herein stated." (Thereupon follows a schedule of damages recoverable). "But the foregoing exceptions shall not deprive the copyright proprietor of any
other remedy given him under this law, nor shall the limitations as
to the amount of recovery apply to infringements occurring after
the actual notice to a defendant, either by service of process in a
suit or other written notice served upon him."
The copyright proprietor then, can 1. recover the actual damages
suffered; 2. recover statutory damages within the minimum - maximum provisions; 3. recover according to a fixed scale; or 4. recover
such damages as the court may think just. The system of remedies
as thus enumerated are exclusive 72 whenever the question is the determination of what damages to assess for the infringement of a copyright. The reason underlying this proposition is that by complying
with the provisions necessary to secure a statutory copyright, the rights
at common law are thereby forfeited and the remedies provided for
by statute alone remain. The legislative intent was to thus provide
for the situations wherein actual proof of the profits received or damages
sustained was difficult to ascertain. 73 Congress was motivated by:
"A desire to provide for the recovery by the proprietor of full
compensation from the wrongdoer for the damages such proprietor
has sustained from the wrongful act of the latter. In the fact of
the difficulty of determining the amount of such damages in all
cases, the statute provides a minimum sum for a recovery in any
case, leaving it open for a larger recovery upon proof of greater
damage in those cases where such proof can be made." 74
The fact of the provisions of this section being for compensation
merely and not by way of a penalty for infringement cannot be too
strongly stressed. As one text writer has observed:
"The imposition of the statutory or 'in lieu' damages deters
wilful infringement, which otherwise would be encouraged, but its
true basis lies not in penalty or punishment but rather in compensating the copyright owner where proof of damages or discovery of profits is difficult, if not impossible." 75
Or, as the courts have expressed it, "The purpose . . . is to prevent

unjust enrichment."
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The phraseology of the section was adopted

72 Loew's, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 18 Cal. (2d) 419
115 P. (2d) 983 (1941).
73 Burndy Engineering Co. v. Sheldon Service Corp., 127 F. (2d) 661 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1942).
74 Brady v. Daly, 175 U. S. 148, 154, 44 L. Ed. 109, 112 (1899).
75 Shafter, Musical Copyright (2d Ed. 1939).
76 Washingtonian Pub. Co. v. Pearson, 140 F. (2d) 465, 467 (App. D. C.
1944).

NOTES
to avoid "strictness of construction" 77 so the award of damages should
be made under the provisions of the section only in the absence of
proof of actual damages. And in no event should they be assess d
on the theory of punishment. 78 The courts have in some cases79
looked upon these statutory damages in the nature of penalties, but the
present trend reflects a certain amount of reluctance to so decide,
especially where the infringement is a technical and unintentional
one.80
As a general proposition it may be stated that where there are acts
constituting an infringement of a copyright there is liability for damages under the statute. Disregarding for a time the measure of such
damages, it becomes of importance to determine under what circumstances an infringement begins and when it may be said to end. For
as has been seen in the case of radio, a rebroadcast by one receiving
a program will constitute an infringement where this rebroadcast is
for the public and for profit. And it will constitute an infringement
separate and distinct from that committed by the broadcasting station itself.8 1 Therefore, evidence of separate or subsequent infringements, though really encompassed in the doing of a single act, become
of paramount importance in assessing the amount of damages recoverable. Thus where a catalogue infringed three distinct copyrights and
there were four separate issues published, none of which were identical,
82
the court allowed damages for twelve rather than three infringements.
Similarly, where a contract existed for the use of certain advertising
materials, which contract was cancelled after one year, the subsequent
use of the materials in five advertisements constituted a separate infringement for each publication, within the meaning of the statutory
minimum damage clause.83 As applied to radio broadcasting, where
a copyright owner's musical composition was performed on three
separate occasions by a radio network with chain hook-ups on sixtyseven, sixty-six, and eighty-five stations, there were two hundred and
eighteen infringements and not merely three.8 4
Earlier cases under the Act of 1909 show a diversity of opinion and
apparently proceed on a different theory - that the actual infringement is not in the printing but in the engraving of the plates and so
the subsequent use thereof is immaterial. Such was the holding in
Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 U. S. 207, 209, 79 L. Ed. 862, 864 (1935).
78 Davilla v. Brunswick-Balke Collender Co., 94 F. (2d) 567 (C. C. A. 2d,
1938).
79 Taylor v. Gilman, 24 Fed. 632 (S. D. N. Y. 1885).
80 Norm Co. v. Brown Co., 26 F. Supp. 707 (W. D. Okla. 1939).
81 Buck v. LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U. S. 191, 75 L. Ed. 971 (1931).
82 Burndy Engineering Co. v. Sheldon Service Corp., 127 F. (2d) 661 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1942).
8a Zuckerman v. Dickson, 35 F. Supp. 903 (W. D. Pa. 1940).
84 Law v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 51 F. Supp. 798 (S. D. N. Y. 1943).
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Sauer v. Detroit Times Co.85 wherein the infringement was the publishing of a copyrighted map in two separate editions of a newspaper. In
construing the statute the court said that inasmuch as the infringing
party acted in good faith and ceased publication immediately upon
notice that the court in its discretion could treat the acts as one rather
than a separate infringement. On the other hand, as early as 1845 86
the principle was enunciated that every printing for sale was a new
infraction of the copyright, although the same plates were used each
time. The present and to be preferred rule was established by the Supreme Court in 1919 8T wherein it stated: "Each copyright is treated
as a distinct entity, and the infringement of it as a distinct wrong, to
be redressed through the enforcement of this liability." There, copyrights were held on each of six pictorial illustrations of styles in women's
apparel and there was one publication of each of five illustrations and
two publications of the sixth. the court in deciding that there were
seven separate and distinct infringements asserted:
"The statute says that the liability thus defined is imposed for
infringing 'the copyright in any' copyrighted work. The words are
in the singular, not the plural." 88
The wording of the present Act is likewise in the singular and the instant case has been cited as authority 89 in rendering a similar interpretation of the section in question. 90
As to the measure and quantum of damages recoverable, attention is
directed to the fact that the court by reason of the "in lieu of" clause
in section 25 (b) 91 has the power to award statutory damages even
though actual damages can be proved. The court in such cases exercises its discretion when it appears that the actual damages are insufficient recompense for the injury inflicted. A more detailed treatment of this clause will be made when dealing with the general discretionary powers of the court under the statute. For the present it
is sufficient to note the power and to examine the decisions in the light
thereof. The damages under this section 92 "shall in no . . . case exceed the sum of $5,000 nor be less than the sum of $250." And sc
where the number of infringements was insufficient to justify a recovery of the minimum damages under the statute because the infringed subject matter came within the specific schedule set out in
85
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247 Fed. 687 (E. D. Mich. 1917).
Reed v. Carusi, 20 Fed. Cas. 431, No. 11,642 (D. Md. 1845).
Westermann Co. v. Dispatch Printing Co., 249 U. S. 100, 105, 63 L. Ed.

499, 502 (1919).

88 Westermann v. Dispatch Printing Co., 249 U. S. 100, 105, 63 L. Ed. 499,
502 (1919).
89 Notes 17 L. R. A. 760 (1922).
90 17 U. S. C. A. § 1.
91 17 U. S. C. A. § 25 (b).
92 17U. S.C.A.§25 (b).
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the Act, the court is empowered to disregard the actual measure and
award $250 damages. In such a case the minimum award is mandatory. But where the measure will aggregate in excess of the minimum
amount recoverable the measure as specified in the schedule shall prevail. 98 Or where the copies of the infringing work are not of a nature
to be valued at the specified schedule rate of $1, it has been held that
proof of actual damage is so insufficient as to justify the court in awarding damages in its discretion. Otherwise the award would be in excess of the damage actually suffered. 94 In this latter case there were
5,000 copies of an infringing road map sold but it did not appear that
the business of the copyright owner was appreciably affected thereby.
Therefore the court awarded $2,000 rather than $5,000 damages. So
also where there were approximately 39,000 cards printed advertising
the sale of dishes and a copyright thereon was thereby infringed. The
court acted in its discretion and awarded $2,500 damages because the
claims varied from $28,000 on the part of the plaintiff to a loss of
$1,000 by the defendant. 95 The justification for so holding was
enunciated by the court in the case of Kraft v. Cohen,96 wherein it
was said:
"While the statute fixes as damages the sum of $1 for every
infringing copy, the provision is permissive merely, and the amount
of damages under the circumstances of this case are left to the
discretion of the court."
In the instant case 5,000 copies of a catalogue were printed in which
there were used certain copyrighted photographs. The catalogue was
not sold but was used merely as an advertising medium and at the
time the suit was instituted there were still 2,000 copies in the possession of the defendant. The court awarded $750 instead of $3,000
as damages.
There have been a few cases wherein a profit has been made by the
infringing party but the court nevertheless disregarded the provisions
of the statute and applied neither the statutory minimum nor the measure of actual damages suffered. Thus where a motion picture company infringed a copyrighted dramatic production by incorporating a
portion thereof into one of their movies, the court awarded the copyright owner one fifth of the net profits realized, 97 saying:
"It is now settled that where a portion of the profits of an infringing work is attributable to the appropriated work, to avoid
Schellberg v. Empringham, 36 F. (2d) 991 (S. D. N. Y. (1929).
94 General Drafting Co. v. Andrews, 37 F. (2d) 54 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930).
95 Sebring Pottery Co. v. Steubenville Pottery Co., 9 F. Supp. 384 (N. D.
Ohio 1934).
98 32 F. Supp. 821, 825 (E. D. Pa. 1940).
97 20th Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Stonesifer, 140 F. (2d) 579 (C. C. A.
9th, 1944).
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an unjust course by giving the originator all profits where the infringer's labor and artistry have also to an extent contributed to
the ultimate result, there may be a reasonable approximation and
apportionment by the court of the profits derived therefrom. We
find no reason to disturb the award of damages."
And in the case of Sammons v. Colonial Press 98 wherein the printer
was sued as a co-infringer for the profits he realized in printing a
book for an infringing publisher, the court denied recovery as against
him and stated that:
"the measure of damages is the profits which the plaintiffs would
have made upon additional sales of its copyrighted book, had not
the infringing book been competing in the market."
and that:
"the amount of such profits (if any were actually made) will be
the measure of recovery and it will no longer be permissible to
decree statutory damages 'in lieu' of actual damages and pro'fits."
As heretofore noted, the maximum - minimum provisions of the
statute are controlling whenever the court exercises its discretion under
the authority of the 'in lieu of' clause. 99 As has been said by the Supreme Court: 100

"The maximum and minimum provisions were intended to be
applicable to all types of infringements except those for which
the section makes other specific provision."
But in the absence of proof of actual damages the minimum award
of $250 has been held to be mandatory. 1° 1 On the other hand, where
there is satisfactory proof of the copyright owner's actual damage or
of the infringer's actual profits, the court is not justified in exercising
its discretion and awarding statutory damages under the "in lieu of"
clause. 10 2 The court in the case of Westermann Co. v. Dispatch Printing Co.' 0 3 summarized the applicability of the provisions of this section when it stated:
"The fact that these damages are to be 'in lieu of actual damages' shows that something other than aotual damages is intended
that another measure is to be applied in making the assessment.
There is no uncertainty as to what that measure is or as to its
limitations. The statute says, first, that the damages are to be
98
99

126 F. (2d) 341, 344, 350 (C. C. A. 1st, 1942).
17 U. S. C. A. § 25 (b).

100 Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co. v. Buck, 283 U. S. 202, 206, 75 L. Ed. 978,
981 (1931).
101 Buck v. Bilkie, 63 F. (2d) 447 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933).
102
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such as to the court shall appear to be just; next, that the court
may, in its discretion, allow the amounts named in the appended
schedule; and finally, that in no case shall they be more than
$5,000 nor less than $250, except that for a newspaper reproduction of a copyrighted photograph they shall not be more than
$200 nor less than $50. In other words, the court's conception
of what is just in a particular case, considering the nature of the
copyright, the circumstances of the infringement, and the like, is
made the measure of damages to be paid, but with the express
qualification that in every case the assessment must be within the
prescribed limitations; that is to say, neither more than the maximum nor less than the minimum. Within these limitations the
court's discretion and sense of justice are controlling, but it has
no discretion when proceeding under this provision to go outside
of them."
Even though the statute provides for damages where no damages
can be proved, does this necessarily mean that an infringer is liable
irregardless of whether damages were suffered by the copyright
proprietor? This question was answered in the negative in the case
of Rudolf Lesch Fine Arts, Inc. v. Metal 104 wherein all infringing
reproductions of a painting were seized and impounded before any
could be sold. The court concluded that no actual damages had been
inflicted by reason of the infringement and assessed nominal damages
of one dollar. But even where the damages are trivial the courts have
assessed minimum statutory damages. Thus where the choruses of
the song "The Sidewalks of New York" and "Let Me Call You Sweetheart" were copied and sold at a profit of $5.10, the court nevertheless awarded $250 damages, refuting the argument of the infringing
publisher that the infringement "was technical only, wholly unintentional, and trivial in nature," 105 and that recovery should be limited
to the actual profit made on the transaction. Actual damage, however,
had been suffered. Clearly distinguishable is the case of Washingtonian
Publishing Co. v. Pearson 10 where the infringers - authors of a book
- incorporated therein an article for which they had paid the author,
but without consent of the copyright proprietor who was a magazine
publisher whose magazine ceased publication some two years before the
infringement took place. The court refused to assess statutory damages, stating that no actual damage had been caused the copyright
proprietor and all that he was possibly entitled to was an apportionment of the profits - in that case $15.41. The court stressed the
provisions of the Copyright Act and cited verbatim the authority of
the court to pay to the copyright proprietor "such damages as the
51 F. Supp. 69 (S. D. N. Y. 1943).
Johns & Johns Printing Co. v. Paull-Pioneer Music Corp., 102 F. (2d)
282, 283 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939).
106 140 F. (2d) 465 (App. D. C. 1914).
104
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copyright proprietor may have suffered due to the infringement." 'o7
Inasmuch as no damages had been suffered, but the profits resulting
therefrom had been proved, the court refused to exercise its discretion
under the "in lieu of" clause. Thus the fact of no actual damages
having been suffered, and the inability to prove the actual damages
inflicted, must be distinguished. In the former case, nominal and not
statutory damages are recoverable, whereas the latter situation comes
within the purpose for which the statute was enacted - that108
is those
cases wherein actual damages are not and cannot be proved.
It has been intimated in some of the decisions previously cited that
the statutory minimum - maximum provisions are not always controlling. The statute itself contains a schedule of the damages recoverable in certain cases of infringement, 0 9 and the question to be determined is what measure shall be adopted where the aggregate amount
recoverable in accordance with that schedule is not equal to the minimum or is in excess of the maximum allowances expressly provided for.
In other words, will the measure control the statutory limitations, and
if so, in what class of cases? As was seen in the case of Jewell LaSalle
Realty Co. v. Buck 110 the limitation provisions were intended to be
controlling whenever the other specific statutory provisions were inapplicable. Thus, where an infringer after notice thereof continued
his invasion of the copyright owner's exclusive right and published
8,000 books containing material constituting an infringement, damages
were correctly assessed at $1 per copy and the plaintiff allowed to
recover $8,000.111 But where evidence of actual damage as thus inflicted is either exorbitant or insufficiently established, the court will
fall back on its broader powers of assessing "such damages as to the
court shall appear to be just" 112 under the circumstances. Thus
where tbere were 7,000 infringing copies of a copyrighted song printed,
the court refused to apply the measure of $1 per copy, it appearing
that the song retailed for 15c per copy and the return to the copyright owner was approximately 8c per copy. In awarding damages
of $560 the court stated:
"While the discretion of the court may be used to award damages where no proof of actual damages is offered, yet the award
should have relation to such inferences as are reasonably deducible from the whole case of infringement." 118
And where the profits of an infringing movie were $19,800, the copyright proprietor was nevertheless entitled to recover only $3,960, that
107
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sum being the proportionate amount that his composition contributed
to the finished product.1 14 And where 50,000 copies of a magazine
were sold to the public which contained an infringing photograph, the
copyright owner was nevertheless entitled to recover only $1,000, that
being the amount determined by the court to be just in the absence
of any proof of actual damages.
The election of the court whether or not to exercise its discretion
in the award of statutory 11 5 damages and what curbs there are to this
quasi-equitable jurisdiction has been the basis for a good portion of
the case law on copyrights. The authority of the court so to exercise
its discretion is contained in the so-called "in lieu of" clause - "or in
lieu of actual damages and profits, such damages as to the court shall
appear to be just." 116 This has been interpreted to mean:
"An election or discretionary choice between actual damages
and profits on the one side and, on the other side, an assumed or
somewhat arbitrary award of such damages as may be just." 117
Thus, "it is for the court to decide what kind of damages best fits the
case." 118 and the specific provisions in the Act enumerating a definite
measure to be utilized in certain cases has been construed to come
within this discretionary power - the measure being merely permissive and thus leaving the amount to be awarded to the court's discretion. 119 As was declared in a very recent case:
"The damages to be assessed are to be fixed by the trial court
based upon the record. The amount is discretionary if within the
statutory limits. This rule was established in order to give more
than nominal damages where the amount was incapable of
proof." 120

And where the power is exercised within the statutory limits, it is not
subject to review on appeal. 121 Also, where on trial no proof of actual damages is offered and no finding is made on the subject, the
assessment of statutory rather than actual damages lies in the court's
discretion and is not reviewable. 122 As was said by the Supreme
Court:
114 20th Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Stonesifer, 140 F. (2d) 579 (C. C. A.
9th, 1944).
115 Zenn v. Nat'l Golf Review, 27 F. Supp. 732 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
116 17 U. S. C. A. § 25 (b).
117 Westermann Co. v. Dispatch Printing Co., 233 Fed. 609, 612 (C. C. A.
6th, 1916). Reversed on other grounds 249 U. S. 100, 63 L. Ed. 499 (1919).
118 Fargo Mercantile Co. v. Brecket & Richter Co., 295 Fed. 823, 829 (C.
C. A. 8th, 1924).
119 Kraft v. Cohen, 32 F. Supp. 821 (E. D. Pa. 1940).
120 Towle v. Ross, 32 F. Supp. 125, 128 (D. Ore. 1940).
121
Hartfield v. Peterson, 91 F. (2d) 998 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
122 Johns & Johns Printing Co. v. Paull-Pioneer Music Corp., 102 F. (2d)
282 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939).
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"In other words, the employment of the statutory yardstick,
within set limits, is committed solely to the court which hears the
case and this fact takes the matter out of the ordinary rule with
respect to abuse of discretion. This construction is required by the
language and purpose of the statute." 123
Judge Learned Hand, in attempting to interpret the provisions of section 25 (b), formulated a test of this discretion which has been consistently followed in subsequent decisions. He said:
"in place of the old penalties the court is to estimate damages,
but to estimate them within the sums given, without the limitations of usual legal proof. I think the whole course of damages,
and that, in substituting for rigid penalties the discretionary power
of the court, we must assume that a plaintiff should not fail for

lack of proof."

124

This election as to what damages should be allowed - statutory or
125
It
actual - is not a matter of choice with the plaintiff, however.
rests solely in the sound discretion of the court and cannot be demanded as a matter of right. Thus where a newspaper appropriated
a copyrighted article from a magazine publisher who intended to print
the same in his own magazine, and it was published by the newspaper
within six days of the date it was scheduled to appear in the magazine
in question, the plaintiff was indemnified on the basis of actual damages and profits rather than in accordance with the provisions of the
statute, it appearing that the damages and profits resulting from the
infringement were ascertainable, and the court electing to decide the
126
case on that basis.
What then are the distinguishing features between the award of
damages at the common law and those allowable under provisions of
the statutes? As a general proposition it may be stated that at the
common law there are no limits to the amount recoverable in case
of infringement - provided, however, that the damage can be proved.
Whereas under the statute the copyright owner may recover the full
amount of actual damages where the actual damage is provable, and
where there is an intentional infringement after notice, he may recover on the basis of the statutory schedule, even though in so doing
the sum received exceeds the maximum allowable. Otherwise, where
the proof of actual damages or profits is not ascertainable, he may
recover on a sliding scale between the minimum - maximum limitations of $250 and $5,000. In no case however, may the award exceed
123
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the maximum scale, save in the two exceptions noted - where there is
proof of actual damage, or where there is an intentional infringement
after notice.
It becomes important then to determine in a given case just what
evidence of damage there is. But the task is complicated by two
qualifying and conflicting tenets: 1. Frequently because of the circumstances of the case actual damage is impossible of determination;
and 2. Once determined, it is frequently inadmissible at the trial of
the cause because of the Rules of Evidence. Those cases coming
within the twilight zone - that nebulous plane upon which meet the
practicality of securing evidence and the theory of being able to
present it - illustrate the difficulty of attempting to collect monetary
compensation solely on the theory of damages without recourse to the
provisions of the Act. Furthermore, they illustrate the purpose for
which the Act was formulated and passed, and also serve to justify
the liberal provisions allowing damages where no actual damages can
be proved. *Thus, in Turner & Dahnken v. Crowley,1 27 the damage
inflicted was the amount the plaintiff would have made on the sale
of a like number of copies, and in Sammons v. Colonial Press 128 it

was the profits he would have made had not the infringing book been
competing upon the market. But where a magazine publisher had
gone out of business and two years subsequent thereto there was an
infringement of one of the articles which had appeared in his now
defunct publication, the court found no evidence of damage and apportioned the value of the contribution of the article to the completed
work and awarded damages in the form of a percentage of the
profits. 129 Generally, all that is required is to prove the facts constituting an infringement and that damage resulted, although incapable
of being ascertained. These things being shown, relief may be had
under the Act. The paucity of cases wherein' recovery has been had
outside the Act on the theory of damages, and not as a part of the
profits so as to prevent unjust enrichment, illustrate the shortcomings
of the recovery under the common law doctrine and the wisdom of the
present statutory provisions.
An objection may be raised on the theory that due to the limitations on the maximum amount recoverable, the small time copyright
owner is thereby precluded from securing relief because of the prohibitive expense of bringing a suit. And that once the litigation is
finished, he may have asserted his paramount and exclusive right but
the cost of instituting and maintaining a suit leave him with no recovery
for the damage he has suffered by reason of the infringement. The
127
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framers of the Act appreciated this difficulty and made special provision therefor:
"In all actions, suits, or proceedings under this title, except
when brought by or against the United States or any officer thereof, full costs shall be allowed, and the court may award to the
prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 130
But the court is not required to award attorney's fees under this section.' 3' To remedy this and other defects of the Act and assure to
the small copyright holder his day in court - not only to assert his
right but to recover compensation for whatever infringements may
have been committed - the American Society of Composers, Authors,
and Publishers was formed.
Conclusion
The foregoing is but a summation of one isolated measure of the
legal and equitable relief accorded those who possess either a common
law copyright or that accorded them by virtue of their conformity
with the provisions of statute. Although no detailed treatment has
been made of the provisions for accounting for profits nor that relating to equitable remedies, it was the manifest intention to exhaust
the one subject of paramount importance to the small copyright proprietor - the recovery of money damages for the infringement committed. Although the remedies are adequate, they are by no means
co-extensive with the varying situations presented whenever a copyright is infringed. But as was the case with the correction of defects
in the common law copyright by legislative enactment, subsequent
statutory provisions will undoubtedly provide for the loop holes in the
law that now exist.
Undoubtedly, adequate legal machinery has been noted in the treatment of the cases, justice has been accorded those who have been
wronged, whether that justice was meted out by reason of the specific
statutory measures provided or the discretionary powr vested in the
court by reason of the Copyright Act.
Robert E. Sullivan.

CLOSED TRANSACTIONS IN SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY.-One of

the most important of the many controversial fields concerned with
the taxability of income (and deductibility of similar items) is the determination of when any particular item becomes income or becomes
deductible from income. In what particular taxable year these items
130
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17 U. S. C. A. § 40.
Buck v. Crescent Gardens Operating Co., 28 F. Supp. 576 (D. Mass. 1939).
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are returned or deducted necessarily involves the problem of "closed
transactions." It is the purpose of this article to outline in brief some
of the general principles relating to closed transactions, calling particular attention to those governing the recognition of gain from the
sale of personal property.
Income taxes are concerned only with realized gain. Paper profits
or estimated profits are not realized gain until the property is sold that is, until the transaction is completed. Capital gain is ordinarily
taxable income only if it results from a "sale" or an "exchange." This
conclusion is reached by the application of two theories of the income
tax law: that theory developed in the celebrated case of Eisner v.
Macomber 1 (there can be no taxable income until something is realized
out of which to pay the tax), and that of the application of the concept of "closed transactions," which requires an event of a definite
nature to substantiate the fact of gain in a particular taxable year.
There must be a demonstrable fixing of a taxable gain, and like considerations are applicable to capital and ordinary losses. The Regulations 2 provide that statutory deductions for losses "must be evidenced
by closed and completed transactions, fixed by identifiable events,"
and "substance and not mere form will govern" in determining what
losses are deductible. The closed transaction must determine the existence of and the amount of such loss. 3 Where the identifiable
event is a sale, the transaction must ordinarily be closed and completed in the year in which the deduction is taken. 4 In general, as
for gains, a taxpayer on the cash basis includes in gross income all
taxable income actually or constructively received during the year in
cash or its equivalent; if he is on the accrual basis he includes in gross
income all taxable income that accrues during the year. 5 Hence, we
readily see the importance of determining when a particular transaction results in taxable gain or a deductible loss. If a disposition of
property takes the form of a sale for a money consideration, the resulting profit or loss is "recognized" for tax purposes at the time
when the sale is consummated. In other words, the taxable year in
which this gain or loss arises is that in which the transaction causing
it is closed. But the great question remains: when is a transaction
closed?
The problem of when a transaction is closed is particularly troublesome, and the question of when an item becomes taxable income or a
deductible loss remains today practically unanswered, but a reason1 252 U. S. 189, 64 L. Ed. 521 (1919).
2 Regulation 103-Income Tax, Sec. 19.23 (e)-1.
3 U. S. v. S. S. White Dental Co., 274 U. S. 398, 401; 47 S. Ct. 598, 71 L.
Ed. 1120 (1927).
4 Shoenberg v. Commissioner, 77 F. (2d) 446, 448 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935).
5 I. R. C. Sec. 42.
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ably satisfactory answer must be found. No longer can we solve the
problem solely by reference to the accounting methods employed by
the taxpayer, but there must be taken into consideration the limitations of the statute and recent broad concepts of income.6 There is
no single controlling factor, no hard and fast rules of thumb that can
be used to determine when a sale is consummated - the transaction
closed and taxable income received or deductible losses sustained but the transaction must be viewed as a whole and in the light of
realism and practicality.7 Rulings and decisions are numerous and
extensive as to when a transaction is closed, and there are statutory
provisions and regulations as to methods of accounting and periods in
which items of income are includible and losses sustained, but at most
these are but concepts, leaving much to the discretion of the Commissioner, causing arbitrary tax results in many instances, and providing for no explicit rules of law by which a particular transaction
may be determined. Numerous cases provide the taxpayer with tests
to be applied to certain types of transactions, with contingencies which
affect the sale to make it closed or not closed, with distinguishing
situations, with important considerations to be taken into account,
and with certain other guideposts, but with no clear-cut, absolute rules
governing all sales of property.
The principles governing sales of personal property are in the most
part also those governing the sale and exchange of real property.
Speaking in general terms, there are two essential elements of a closed
transaction: 1. a transfer from the seller to the buyer of title, possession, and burdens of ownership, and 2. payment of the purchase
price to the seller.8 The primary question always to be determined is
when the sale is made. This question can be answered only by subjecting each particular transaction to tests that have been laid out in
court decisions, by the method of inclusion and exclusion - what a
particular transaction is and what it is not. Following are several
types of sales transactions of personal property showing criteria
which have been applied in the courts to determine whether or not
they were closed transactions.
Probably the most basic test, and one most often quoted, is that
stated by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which
is as follows: 9
"A closed transaction for tax purposes results from a contract
of sale which is absolute and unconditional on the part of the
seller to deliver to the buyer a deed upon payment of a consideration and by which the purchaser secures immediate possession
2 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcOME TAxATIoN (1942), Sec. 12.01.
1 PRENTICE-HALL 1947 FEDERAL TAX SERvIcE, Sec. 6255.
8 Ibid, Sec. 6253.
9 Commissioner v. Union Pacific R. Co., 86 F. (2d) 637 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
6
7
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and exercises all the rights of ownership. The delivery of a deed
may be postponed and payment of part of the purchase price may
be deferred by installment payments; but for taxing purposes it
is enough if the vendor obtains under the contract the unqualified
rights to recover the consideration."
Only a few general rules can be formulated, and none can be absolutely depended upon to answer our question as to when the sale is
made. The ultimate question is not solely of law, but usually a mixed
question of law and fact. The transaction ".... must have reached the
stage of reasonable certainty that the transaction will be carried out." 10
No substantial contingencies must exist; the taxpayer must be unconditionally liable, and the obligation of the purchaser must be absolute
and the appropriation by the seller irrevocable. As pointed out in the
previously quoted decision, the question resolves itself to this: when
have there been enforceable rights and obligations created? The terms
of the contract of sale taken as a whole should be determined in view
of the intention of the parties, their acts, and all surrounding circumstances when profits (or losses) on sales of property are taxable
(and deductible).
Very general principles as to when gain is recognized may be stated
as follows: 1. in case of a taxpayer on the cash basis there is a closed
transaction when the purchase price is received; 2. if the taxpayer is
on the accrual basis, the income from the sale of personal property
should be reported for the year in which title passes. Income accrues
when an enforceable right to title arises. If the transaction is a sale,
the income, it would seem, judging from the cases and on principle,
should be reported in the year in which there arises a binding agreement to sell. But the cases and decisions are in hopeless conflict,
due to the variance in state laws on the sale of property and to the
particular exigencies of the individual case, as will be pointed out in
the illustrations to follow.
The most fundamental test and one of the most important and
conclusive circumstances determining that a transaction is closed is
that concerned with when title passes.11 Profits from a sale under a
contract whereby part of the purchase money is deposited in escrow
to await closing of the transaction is realized in the year that the
contract becomes executed by the transfer of title.-'2 Transactions on
13
the New York Stock Exchange become closed only when title passes,
and delivery of the certificate is necessary for a transfer of title to stock.
Passage of title is not, however, an absolute test. If the taxpayer
is on the accrual basis, payment becomes income when it becomes a
10
11

2 MmETENs, LAw op FEDERAL INcOmm TAXATION (1942), Sec. 12.119.
Brown Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 35 F. (2d) 880 (App. D. C. 1929).
12 BedelI v. Commissioner, 30 F. (2d) 622 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
1s Gordon M. Buck, B. T. A. Memo Op. Dkt. 86040 (Dec. 27, 1938).
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".... present, fixed, and unqualified obligation of the purchaser, which
... constitutes an accrued debt . . ." to the seller. 14 On the other

hand, retention of title does not preclude a closed transaction, providing dominion and control over the property have passed to the purchaser. So where the taxpayer sells certain rights to property, receiving payment in the year of the sale partly in cash and partly in
notes due in later years, the transaction is taxable in the year the
sale is made and not when the notes are paid. 15
It is essential that the passage of title be an accomplished fact to
make the transaction closed; the seller's right"of property must pass
to the purchaser. In f.o.b. sales title passes when the property involved is delivered free on board. In determining when title passes,
some courts have followed the principle of the Uniform Sales Act,
which says title to goods sold passes when the parties intend that it
shall pass.
Passage of title coupled with payment of the purchase price and
transfer of possession may be decisive of a closed transaction. If, in
the case of a corporation, the accrual basis of accounting is used, gain
realiized from a sale is taxable for the year the contract is executed,
but not until the transaction is closed if it is on the cash basis, where
there is an abatement of the agreed purchase price.1 The right to
receive and the obligation to pay definite and fixed sums fix the date
when the transaction is closed where the taxpayer keeps his books and
makes his return on the accrual basis; the actual payment and actual
17
receipt of the purchase price are not essential in such an instance.
In an executory contract when there exists an unconditional right
in the purchaser to execution of documents transferring title and on
the part of the seller an unconditional right to the balance of the purchase price the transaction is closed. 18 In a contract for sale of shares
of stock entered into in 1929 but not finally signed until 1930, which
contract provided for the passing of title and the right to possession
on payment of the first installment, the transaction was held closed
in 1930, the year there was a final agreement as to all the details.' 9
Here it will be noted, however, that the title-passing test was not actually applied, the decision resting instead on the theory that a definite
bargain had not been concluded in 1929 but in 1930. The court said:
"Parties must come to an agreement as to all the details, or at least
14 Evergreen Cemetery Ass'n v. Burnet, Commissioner, 45 F. (2d) 667 (App.
D. C. 1930).
15 Appeal of S. A. Hinely, 2 B. T. A: 1027 (1925).
16 Helvering v. Nibley-Mimnaugh Lumber Co., 70 F. (2d) 843 (App. D. C.
1934).
17 U. S. v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 96 F. (2d) 756 (C. C. A. 10th, 1938).
18 Commissioner v. Segall, 114 F. (2d) 706 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940).
19 U. S. Industrial Alcohol Co. v. Helvering, 137 F. (2d) 511 (C. C. A. 2d,
1943).
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as to all except those without the settlement of which the bargain
would nevertheless go through. Although they suppose that they have
agreed, if in fact they have not, their supposition will not serve, and
they are not bound." But the reasoning of this court must be modified
in applying it to any particular situation according to the circumstances of the particular facts, and has been so modified in another
case 20 where the court said: ".... in cases of ambiguity in contracts
... courts will lean towards the presumed intention of the parties...
and will so construe such contracts . . as to effectuate such intent ..."
Even in the application of the most basic test of when title passes
the cases are in no way harmonious. In the often quoted case of
Commissioner v. Union Pacific R. Co. 2 1 the taxpayer sold lands by
installment contracts under which the purchasers took immediate possession, insured and repaired the premises and paid the taxes; the purchase price was not definitely ascertainable until several years after
the contract was made, although a minimum price was set, but final
acceptance of the property was conditional upon approval of title. The
taxpayer was on the accrual basis. The transaction was held to be
closed when the contract was made, since that was the date the seller
had an absolute and unconditional obligation to deliver a deed to the
buyer upon the payment of the consideration, and, furthermore, since
the buyer at that date secured immediate possession and exercised all
the rights of ownership. In an earlier case 22 it was similarly said
that ". . . the consummation of a sale is not dependent upon delivery
of a deed where . ..the consideration was received and the benefits
and burdens of ownership were transferred previously."
Contracts to sell are to be distinguished from contracts of sale. An
agreement whereby a stockholder placed shares of stock in escrow for
a prospective purchaser, who never bound himself to pay for them and
to whom they were never transferred, together with an agreement by
the corporation to convey its assets upon the payment of the purchase
price evidenced by certain notes, did not constitute completed sales
or a closed transaction in the year when the agreements were made,
and hence the stockholder could not deduct from his taxable net income any losses sustained in that year from the sales of stock and
assets. 23 This was correctly held to be an agreement to sell and not
a sale.
The courts 24 have applied statements of Williston on Sales to show
the distinction between a contract to sell and a sale as follows:
20
21
22

MacDonald v. Commissioner, 76 F. (2d) 513 (C.C. A. 2d, 1935).
Commissioner v. Union Pacific R. Co., 86 F. (2d) 637 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).

23

Stiver v. Commissioner, 90 F. (2d) 505 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937).
Dahlinger v. Commissioner, 51 F. (2d) 662 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1931).

24

Standard Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 28 B. T. A. 352 (1933).
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"A contract to sell goods is a contract whereby the seller agrees to
transfer the property in goods to the buyer for a consideration called
the price."
"A sale of goods is an agreement whereby the seller transfers the
property in goods to the buyer for a consideration called the price." 25
The distinction is often expressed by the terms "executory" and "executed" sales.
Besides distinguishing between agreements to sell and sales, distinctions are to be made between a sale and a consignment, and a
loan and a sale.2
A contract for sale of voting trust certificates, representing capital
stock of a corporation, has been held to be an effectuated transfer
thereof, rendering taxable gain during the year the contract was entered
into. 27 This principle comes from the case in which, for example, a
contract was executed on December 20, 1921, but the taxpayer contended that the contract would not become effective until March 28,
1922, the parties contracting for the "purchase to be consummated
and said purchase price paid on the 28th day of March, 1922." Under
the terms of the contract the taxpayer neither retained title to the
certificate nor reserved any power with respect thereto, but delivered
actual possession to the purchaser, and properly endorsed the certificate in blank; and, by giving the purchaser irrevocable proxy and
power of attorney, invested him with authority to do all that he himself
as absolute owner would do had the agreement not been executed, with
the sole exception of having the transfer certificates noted on the
trustees' records. In' consideration of this, the taxpayer had the purchaser's absolute promise to pay secured by collateral of fair value in
excess of the total price of the certificate. The court said that in
interpreting an equivocal transaction, motives may be considered as
bearing on the real nature of the transaction, although primary consideration will be had of what was actually done and the legal effect
thereof. It was presumed by the court that the motive was to avoid
heavier income tax in the year the transaction was entered into.
Where the terms of a sale are complete although 'the subject matter
has not been delivered, nevertheless there may be a closed transaction
and a completed sale if it was the intention of the parties that it was
to take place as of a certain date. 28 It is not necessary that a sale of
personal property be accompanied by delivery if "the obligation to
deliver is so fixed that the loss (or gain) is reasonably certain in fact
and ascertainable in amount." 29 On the other hand, the taxpayer
1 WiLLisTON ON SALES, (2d Ed. 1924), Sec. 1.
26 Old Colony Trust Ass'n v. Hassett, 55 F. Supp. 629 (D. C. Mass. 1944).
27 Brunton v. Commissioner, 42 F. (2d) 81 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930).
28 Stanton v. Commissioner, 98 F. (2d) 739 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938).
29 Ruml v. Commissioner, 83 F. (2d) 257 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
25
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may not hastily divest himself of title to property, taking in exchange
a pledge to carry out an agreement to deliver in exchange certain other
property or securities and thereby evade tax liability for the year in
which the terms of the exchange were actually arrived at and carried
out. Mere postponement of delivery does not, however, mean that
an actual sale has not been consummated.30 Nor does delay in the
payment of the purchase price negative a present sale if the parties
agreed to a delay in payment, providing, however, the transaction was
bona fide and not in evasion of taxation.
What is meant to be an absolute sale may be classified by the
Commissioner as a partial return of capital, as can be seen in the
following situation. In two succeeding years shares of stock were sold
to a syndicate in consideration partly of cash payments and partly
of payments under non-refundable life annuity contracts. It was
held 31 that the sales were not closed transactions, but the cash payments and annuity payments received in the years in which the sale
was made were treated as return of capital to the extent that they
represented cash to the seller, and the amount received by him over
and above his cost of the stock should be computed as taxable gain
in the year in which he received it, for the reason that the promise to
make the payments under the annuity contract had no ascertainable
market value for purposes of taxation in the year in which they were
made.
These few illustrations, brief statements of principles, tests and rules
outlined in this article are not, of course, comprehensive, and were not
meant to be so. They cannot serve to solve the taxpayer's intricate
and individually peculiar problems, but they are intended to help guide
him, if only by pointing out the importance of the problem together
with showing him some of the many considerations he must take into
account in determining when to include income or take allowable deductions.
Frederick N. Hoover.

TAXATION PARTNERSHIP BUSINESS INSURANCE.---"What tragic
irony for able men to spend precious years in building a successful
business only to have it collapse in ruin when a partner dies ...because they 'Did Not Know.'" 1 These are indeed powerful words
and yet they are the exact words of the life underwriter as he makes
30 Hoffman v. Commissioner, 71 F. (2d) 929 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
31 Hills Estate v. Maloney, 58 F. Supp. 164 (D. N. J. 1944).
1 Gravengaard, How to Preserve Yow Partnership, The Diamond Life

Bulletins.
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his approach to a client. What is the life insurance salesman going
to tell the lawyer's partnership clients that is going to affect him as
an attorney? He will explain to the partners the basis of their legal
existence as a business. He will point out to them that they are working today as a "team." The salesman might present one of the
partners with a previously prepared letter like this:
"Jones, I'm terribly sorry, but I've unexpectedly got to go
away, and it's very doubtful that I'll ever be back. So, I wish
you'd collect all outstanding accounts receivable - complete all
of our present contracts - sell all our assets at public auction,
or at a private sale, to anyone who will pay a fair price - pay
off all of our creditors - and then give my wife half of what is
left. I hope there'll be enough to clean up all of our obligations,
Jones; otherwise I guess you'll have to make up the difference out
of your own personal savings, because Mary and I haven't been
able to accumulate anything more than we have in the business.
I'm just awfully sorry, Jones, but I can't help it, so good-bye, and
lots of good luck."
The salesman would undoubtedly follow this letter with the following
words:
"Well, Mr. Jones, I suppose you'd think he was crazy; and
yet that is really what you would have to do if word came to
you today, that your partner had passed away. It would be a
pretty tough break, wouldn't it? As you probably know, Mr.
Jones, the death of your partner would immediately dissolve the
partnership - that's the law. There are only four alternatives
for your choice in a spot like that." 2
What are Mr. Jones' alternatives? Under a plan of reorganization,
he could buy the interest of the deceased partner and continue the
business as a proprietorship. Obviously this is ideal, but there is no
assurance that the heirs would sell at a reasonable price. The heirs
have a legal right to insist on receiving cash in full or compel the
partnership to liquidate. If the survivor is depending on his present
credit rating based upon his partnership interest as a going concern
to borrow money with which to pay the heirs, he will most likely
find such credit greatly lessened as a result of his associate's death.
Mr. Jones may be fortunate enough to locate a new partner who has
the necessary business requisites in addition, of course, to enough
cash to satisfy the heirs before the partnership creditors force liquidation. Another alternative is to take one of the heirs into the business
as a partner. For reasons too numerous to mention, this arrangement
seldom is successful. The last alternative is liquidation. This could
2 Gravengaard, Partnership and Life Insurance, The Diamond Life Bulletins.
Bulletins.
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be done by Mr. Jones's selling his interest in the business. Then Mr.
Jones finds himself in the usually undesirable situation of being without a position and thus without income. Usually, one of the least
desirable choices would be for Mr. Jones to liquidate the business and
settle with the executor of the deceased partner. In this event much
of the asset value is certain to be lost, and, in the case of assets such
as good will, a total loss might result.
A considerable portion of these problems could have been avoided
by a proper drawing of the articles of partnership. The basis and
purposes of such articles might well find expression in the words of
Benjamin Franklin. "Partnerships often finish in quarrels; but I was
happy in this, that mine were all carried on and ended amicably owing, I think, a good deal to the precaution of having very explicitly
settled in our Articles everything to be done by, or expected from,
each partner, so there was nothing to dispute, which precaution I
would therefore recommend to all who enter into partnerships." These
basic problems for many years have fallen squarely upon the shoulders
of the attorney, and now the life insurance field has created the new
and modem answer to a large portion of the remaining difficulties
arising from the partnership organization. The success or failure of
the partnership insurance agreement lies within the providence of the
practicing attorney. The numerous decisions of recent years on this
legal proposition bear out the statement that, like most phases of the
law, there are now in use by practicing attorneys agreements which
have been proven to be bad, some of which can be classed as good,
others as better, and still others as the best.
The partnership agreement must provide the right for the surviving
partner to purchase the interest of the. deceased partner at a fair value,
and the method of arriving at such a value must be stated in the agreiment. It must also provide for some type of financing plan whereby
the funds will be immediately available to the survivor to make such
purchase. The partnership insurance agreement presupposes the insurability of the partners; and, although it is proposed in this paper
to proceed on the assumption that the partners are insurable, it should
be noted that other types of financing plans based on the same general
pattern have been designed in those instances where one or both of
the partners are not insurable.
Let us assume the following facts in order to illustrate the mechanics
of that which is considered the "best" plan. Mr. A and Mr. B are
partners who are desirous of having their partnership problems solved
by this new method of protection. The agreement should provide for
A to purchase a life insurance contract on the life of B. A should pay
the premiums and exercise complete control and ownership over this
policy. B will reciprocate in precisely the same manner by purchasing
a policy on the life of A. Mr. B dies and his estate will then contain
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B's interest in the business plus B's life insurance policy on the life
of A. The agreement must provide for A to purchase B's interest
at a reasonable value which is determined by a previously agreed
on formula, and for B's estate to sell this interest. A will take
the proceeds from the policy which he held on the life of B and
purchase B's interest. B's estate now has the cash for the business
interest and in addition the policy on the life of A. The agreement
will remedy this by providing for A to purchase this policy from the
estate of B (usually based on the cash value of the policy).
Is the above plan "tax wise"? Let us see. The Internal Revenue
Code 3 states: "In computing net income no deduction shall in any
case be allowed in respect of ... premiums paid on any life insurance
policy covering the life of any officer or employee, or of any person
financially interested in any trade or business carried on by the taxpayer, when the taxpayer is directly or indirectly a beneficiary under
such policy." Quite obviously, in view of this section the premiums
paid by the partners will not be deductible; however, it should be
noted that where variations of this plan have been attempted to circumvent this result, the decisions have been the same. For example,
in the Joseph Nussbaum case, 4 A had insured his own life payable to
B, and a reciprocal policy was being paid for by the latter. The
court did not allow deduction as to the premiums paid. The premium
payments failed to qualify as "ordinary and necessary business expenses" under the Code.5 Even if the deduction was not disallowed
under the above two referenced sections of the code, it would still have
to pass the limitations imposed by another section of the Code 6 which
7
pertains to deductions allowable to production of tax-exempt income.
Under section 22 (b) (1) of the Code, the proceeds will not represent taxable income. Even if the beneficiary were the partnership
itself, the proceeds would not be taxable income. In this regard however, proper warning should issue as to a common plan whereby A
would assign his policy to B and B would assign his policy to A. The
Code 8 covers this and similar transactions as follows: "In the case
of a transfer for a valuable consideration, by assignment or otherwise, of a life insurance, endowment, or annuity contract, or any interest therein, only the actual value of such consideration and the
amount of the premiums and other sums subsequently paid by the
transferee shall be exempt from taxation under paragraph (1) or this
paragraph." The case of Harverty Realty & Investment Co. 9 held
3

INT. REV. CODE, § 24 (a) (4)

4
5
6
7
8

19 B. T. A. 868 (1930).

(1938).

INT. REv. CODE, § 23 (a) (1938).
INT. Rav. CODE, § 24 (a) (5) (1938).
2 RABxiN AND JOHNSON (1946) I 2 § 6.
INT. RyV. CODE, § 22 (b) (2) (1938).

9

3 T. C. 161 (1944).
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that parol evidence may be introduced to disprove the recital of con10
sideration in the instrument of transfer. Rabkin & Johnson, in referring to an amendment to the Code," interprets this section as providing that the "consideration" test is not applicable where ". .. such
contract or interest therein has a basis for determining gain or loss
in the hands of a transferee determined in whole or in part by reference to such basis of such contract or interest therein in the hands of
the transferor." The opinion refers to this section as a "new exception"
which "would seem to be applicable to the proceeds of a policy taken
out by one partner on the life of another, and then contributed to the
partnership. Cf I. T. 2591, C. B. X-2, 123. The regulations point
out, however, that the transferee of a policy in a non-taxable transfer
may realize income upon the death proceeds where the transferor had
acquired the policy by outright purchase. Reg. Sec. 29.22 (b) (2)-3,
as amended by T. D. 5271 (June 14, 1943)." It should be noted that
the original plan qualifies under an exception to the general rule.
Where the policy had been acquired by the insured in an assignment
or transfer for a consideration, the death proceeds are not taxable to
the beneficiary.' 2 A had acquired the policy on his (A's) life from B's
estate for a consideration, but since A was insured, the proceeds on
that policy would not be income to A's heirs.
One of the most important tax advantages which arises in a "buy
and sell" agreement is ably stated by Rabkin & Johnson M as follows: "In these cases, the decedent's interest in the business is includible in his estate. For the purpose of valuing that interest, however, the selling agreement may be important, particularly in the case
of . . . a partnership interest where a high earning history might produce a correspondingly high estate tax 'value.' See Reg. Secs. 81.10
(c), (d). As in any other case in which ... a partnership interest is
subject to a purchase option at the ...partner's death, the value of
the decedent's business interest for estate tax is ordinarily limited to
the price at which the survivor is privileged to buy it."
Under the plan here proposed, it would seem perfectly clear that
no part of the insurance proceeds would be includible in the estate of
the deceased. The difficulty arises in the numerous variations of this
plan. For example, assume that the partnership took out policies on
the lives of A and B. The partnership would exercise complete control and ownership of the policies and would name itself as beneficiary.
There would be an agreement whereby the partnership would purchase the interest of the decedent. "This plan has the obvious advantage of simplicity in operation where there are several ... partners.
AND JOHNSON (1946)

10

2 RAuKxi

11
12

RzvEmNu

13

2 RABKIN AND JOHNSON (1946)

I 2 § 6.

ACT or 1942, §110.

I. T. 3212, 1938 -

2 Cur. Bull. 65.
I 2 § 6.
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Under the present estate tax statute, however, this plan is potentially
dangerous. Even though the decedent possessed none of the 'incidents
of ownership' of the policy on his life, he may be held to have made
an 'indirect' payment of the premiums, with the result that the proceeds would be wholly includible in his estate." 14 Although the case
of Wilson v. Crooks,15 disaffirms the above contention, there are recent cases which are applying the "premium" test which points to the
trend as expressed above.
Another variation of the original plan which is almost certain to result in an undesirable estate valuation is that wherein A takes a
policy on his own life, exercising control and paying the premiums,
but makes B the beneficiary. B does ,the same. Under this arrangement upon the death of B, B's estate will contain both the insurance
proceeds plus B's interest in the business. Inequitable? Yes, but easy
to avoid.
There still remains one plan which is favored by some attorneys
because of its apparent simplicity and directness. Of course these are
desirable elements in any plan, but is it "tax wise"? Assume that A
takes out a policy on his own life, pays premiums etc., and makes his
estate the beneficiary under same. B makes a reciprocal arrangement.
A and B then enter into an agreement whereby each declares that the
proceeds from his respective policy shall be received by his estate in
lieu of his respective business interests, and thus the decedent's interest
will vest absolutely in the survivor without more being done. The results of such a plan will be this. Upon the death of B, B's estate
will take up the amount of the proceeds as beneficiary under B's policy.
See M. W. Dobrzensky.'5 Although B's interest in the business has
been held not to be includible in B's estate under such an arrangement,
it still remains that there is no estate tax advantage since the proceeds •
are includible. Furthermore, such an arrangement might conceivably
become changed whereby the proceeds and the business interest would
both be includible in the decedent's estate. For these reasons this
plan is potentially dangerous.
If, by agreement, A's heir takes out the policy on A, and the heir
exercises all the incidents of ownership, B having a like arrangement
with his heir, and then A and B agree to have their respective heirs
accept the proceeds from their respective policies in lieu of the decedent's business interest, an estate tax saving will have been accomplished. There would be no grounds for including either the business
interest or the proceeds in the estate of the decedent. What is wrong
with these last two variations? Nothing except that such a plan is
perfect groundwork for penalizing the survivor. The case of Paul
14
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Legallet 17 has laid down the rule that proceeds received under such
an arrangement by the estate or family of the decedent are not to be
included in the cost basis of the partnership to the survivor. The
ultimate tax consequences become obvious and automatically eliminate
the use of such a plan to the foresighted counselor.
When there are more than two partners, a different plan will have
to be employed but the same principles will remain applicable. For an
example, Mr. C now joins Mr. A and Mr. B as an equal member of
the partnership. Let us assume that the partnership has assets fairly
valued at $90,000.00. The plan should be set up whereby A takes out
policies on the lives of B and C in the amount of $15,000.00 each. A
will pay the premiums and otherwise exercise all incidents of ownership
with A as beneficiary on these policies. B and C will reciprocate in a
like manner. Let us assume that B dies. B's estate will contain B's
policies on the lives of A and C. Under the provisions of the "buy and
sell" agreement, A and C will take the proceeds from their respective
policies on the life of B and use same to buy B's business interest from
B's estate. A and C will also purchase the policies from the estate of
B which B carried on A and C. A will -take the policy B carried on
C and C will take the policy which B carried on A. B's estate is
now clear, so let us turn to the survivors, A and C. The partnership
still has assets worth $90,000.00 and A and C now own a one-half
interest each with a value of $45,000.00 apiece. A now has two life
insurance policies on the life of C, each in the face amount of $15,000.00
for a grand total of $30,000.00. C has the same on the life of A.
Obviously the totals are insufficient by the amount of $15,000.00 in
order to cover the other's interest. Also it should be noted that the
policies that each obtained from B's estate on the life of the other
were obtained for a consideration and thus fall squarely within the "consideration" rule as stated above. If both A and C are still insurable,
and, depending on extenuating circumstances (such as relationship of
consideration paid to face value, etc.), it would probably be advisable
for A and C to cash in the policies which they received from B's estate
and in place thereof, each take out $30,000.00 policies on the life of
the other. This would place them precisely in the same position as
the partners in the original A and B partnership.
It is true that "partnerships often end in quarrels," but the "tax
wise" attorneys can and must prevent these endings.
Robert Lowell Miller.
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REPORTING

GAINS

AND

LOSSES

FROM LAND

CONTRACTS.-"The

Government in casting about for proper subjects of taxation," warned
Justice Cardozo in Burnet v. Wells,' "is not confined by the traditional
classification of interests or estates. It may tax not only ownership,
but any right or privilege that is a constituent of ownership." Justice
Cardozo's warning is helpful in explaining the position of the courts
in regard to the recognition of gains and losses from the sale of property under land contracts, for the traditional rules of law governing
contracts, equity and real property have not always been strictly adhered to in determining the year in which a capital gain or loss should
be reported from such agreements.
As several courts have pointed out, there are a number of wellestablished principles bearing upon land contracts. Generally, an
executory contract may be breached any time before it has been acted
upon, but part performance makes it binding. As a result of this rule,
a failure to complete an executory agreement after partial performance
subjects the violator to an action for breach of contract and, if the
legal remedy is inadequate, the injured party can go into equity and
compel specific performance. 2 Since "land contracts" are executory
agreements to purchase real estate, they are governed by these rules;
however, a difficulty is projected into such agreements which is not
present in other types of executory agreements: legal title to real
estate passes only upon the proper execution and delivery of a deed.
Thus, the vendee in a land contract acquires equitable title whenever
he ventures to perform, while the legal title does not pass until execution and delivery of the deed. 3 The dilemma which confronts the
courts is whether title passes for tax purposes in the year in which the
equitable interest passes, in the year in which the legal title passes,
or at some undetermined time in between. In answering this question, they are often forced to choose between contradictory factors:
the vendor should not be compelled to pay a tax on his profit until
there is a reasonable certainty that he will realize a profit; yet the
federal government
should be permitted to tax income as soon as
4
possible.
Because these two factors are of equal importance, the courts have
refused to set down a hard and fast rule to govern when sale is consummated under a land contract, for tax purposes. They attempt to
1

289 U. S. 670, 77 L. Ed. 1439, 53 Sup. Ct. 761 (1933).

2

American Land & Investment Co. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 40 F.

(2d) 336, 8 A. F. T. R. 10738 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930); Roy v. Comm'r of Internal
Revenue, 69 F. (2d) 786, 13 A. F. T. R. 798 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934), cert. den. Oct.
8, 1934; Stieff v. Tait, 26 F. (2d) 489 (App. D. C. 1928), Affd. 31 F. (2d) 1020,

1929; Gideon N. Stieff, 2 B. T. A. 1109 (1925).
3 Roy v. Comm'r. of Internal Revenue, 69 F. (2d) 786, 13 A. F. T. R. 798
(C. C. A. 5th, 1934).
4 Note, OPTIONS AND SALZ CONTRACTS IN TAXATION, 46 Yale L. J. 272 (1936).
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view each transaction as a whole and in the light of realism and practicability, having regard to the transfer of possession, the substantial
performance of conditions, and the passing of legal title. 5 It can be
observed safely, however, that when a contract is absolute and unconditional on the part of the seller to deliver to the buyer a deed
upon payment of the consideration and by which the buyer secures
immediate possession and exercises all the rights of ownership, the sale
is consummated for tax purposes. 6 This is true even though the delivery of the deed is postponed and payment of part of the purchase
price is deferred. It is enough if the vendor obtains under the contract the "unqualified right to recover the consideration." 7 A general
rule with alternative provisions can therefore be set out as follows:
The sale occurs at the time a deed is executed and delivered to the
vendee, or at the time the burdens and benefits of ownership are, from
a practical standpoint, transferred to the buyer, whichever occurs first.8
The examination of a few of the typical situations encountered by
the courts will be of assistance in illustrating when the burdens and
benefits of ownership are transferred from a practical standpoint. The
simplest cases to determine were those in which the agreements were
binding upon the vendor only. Although such agreements are technically "option agreements" they are included in many of the modern
land contracts. The leading case of Lucas v. North Texas Lumber
Company 9 concerns an option agreement, but is often used as authority in the land contract cases. In the Lucas case, a Texas corporation for some time prior to 1917 operated a sawmill, selling lumber
and buying and selling timber lands. On December 27, 1916, it gave
the Southern Pine Company a 10-day option to buy its timber lands
for a specified price. The Company was'solvent and able to make
the purchase on that date. On December 30, 1916, the Company
notified the Texas corporation that it would exercise the option, and
the corporation ceased operation Qn the land. The papers which were
required to effect the transfer were delivered, the purchase price paid,
and the transaction finally closed on January 5, 1917. The corporation attempted to report the gain from the sale in 1916, but the court
in holding that it must report it in 1917, pointed out that the agree5 Comm'r. v. Segall, 114 F. (2d) 706 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940), cert. den. 313
U. S. 562 (1941).
0 Comm'r. v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 86 F. (2d) 637 (1936); Comm'r. v.
North Jersey Title Ins. Co., 79 F. (2d) 492 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1935).
7 Comm'r. v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 86 F. (2d) 637 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
8 1 PRENTICE-HALL 1947 FED. TAx SERV. § 6254.
9 281 U. S. 11, 74 L. Ed. 668, 50 Sup. Ct. 184, 8 A. F. T. R. 10276 (1930);
Birch Ranch & Oil Co., 1944, P. H. T. C. MEmORANDUx DEcisioNs § 44,128 (is
the most recent authority for the ruling that the mere giving of an option does
not constitute a taxable sale. In that case, the deed was required to be delivered
only if and when the payments made pursuant to the option agreement aggregated

a certain sum before a fixed date).
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ment in 1916 was a mere option, and that the question of whether the
income was to be received or not could not be determined until the
deed was executed and a substantial portion of the purchase price was
actually paid. Thus, substantial performance was held to be, by the
dictum in the Lucas case, a transfer of the burdens and benefits of
ownership for tax purposes.
In the Newago Portland Cement Company case 10 there was a contract for the sale of land made in 1922 and a 10% down payment made.
The vendor retained possession until the completion of payment in
1923. The Board of Tax Appeals held that title did not pass for practical purposes until 1923.
Sometimes the method of accounting, whether cash or accrual, will
determine the year in which the sale is consummated. Helvering v.
Nibley-Mimnaugh 11 has an excellent discussion on this point. The
parties in that case agreed upon the purchase price and more than 35 %
was paid by the vendee in 1923. The vendor agreed that the timber
acreage would amount to at least 20,000 acres and that the title should
be satisfactory. Both of these conditions were met in 1923, but another condition which provided for a proportionate reduction in the
purchase price should the manufactured lumber and timber be less
than the quantity agreed upon. This condition was not determined
until January 15, 1924, when abatement of the purchase price was
agreed upon and the title, deed, mortgage and secured notes were executed and delivered in February, 1924. The court held that the
year in which the gain from such sale should be reported by the vendor
depended upon whether the seller was on a cash or accrual basis, explaining their holding as follows: "If it (the vendor) was on an
accrual basis, the facts shown are sufficient to accrue the entire purchase price in 1923, and that, too, without regard to the fact that the
agreed price was conditionally subject to abatement. This is true, we
think, because it amply appears that in 1923, in addition to the delivery of the property, the seller had otherwise complied with his contract, as the result of which there existed an unconditional obligation
on the buyer to comply. But a different principle is applicable if the
seller was on a cash basis, for it is unquestioned that the consideration
(over and above the cost of the property to the seller) was not received until 1924." Thus, the transfer of the burdens and benefits of
ownership from a tax standpoint depended upon the accounting
method used.
The ordinary vendor of land under an executory agreement will
have little difficulty in reporting his gains or losses from such land
contracts in the proper year. Option agreements and the popular land
contracts of today which spread the payments over a considerable
10

27 B. T. A. 1097 (1933).
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70 F. (2d) 843 (C. C. A. D. C., 1934).
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number of years and make the execution of the deed dependent upon
payment of all the installments need not be reported as gains or losses
until the option is taken up or the payments are completed, whichever the case may be. It can be seen that the burdens and benefits
of ownership are not transferred at the time of the agreements. It
is hoped that the discussion and rules set out in this article will enable
the taxpayer to determine the year in which he should report gains
and losses in the more difficult cases in which a large percentage of
the purchase price is paid in one year, but the completion of contract
made in the following year. As was pointed out, possession, performance of condition, and the accounting method used are factors
which swing the scales toward the time of passing of equitable title
or legal title.
Robert M. Million.

THE INCORPORATION OF PARTNERSHnS.-Much has been said but
very little precedent exists in actual decided cases on the recognition
of a gain of loss upon the incorporation of a partnership, from the
point of view of taxation. The pendulum of opinion has swung to find
family partnerships and closely owned businesses desiring to incorporate
instead of holding the fears 'concerning excess profits levied upon corporations evident in the war years. Many partnerships composed of
husband and wife have been declared a nullity for income tax purposes
and as a result the entire income of the partnership has been taxed
to the husband or the party contributing the capital. This failure to
establish a partnership has elevated the husband's income into a
still higher income tax bracket. Another factor favoring incorporation
is that many owners of closely owned businesses, existing under partnership agreement, find it necessary to obtain a larger working capital and
by means of incorporation put themselves in a position for public
financing. Thirdly, the lowered corporate tax rates make it definitely
advantageous for a partnership to transfer to a corporate form. And
lastly, partners are looking into the future and guarding against the
possibility of any disagreement between the heirs upon dissolution of
the partnership by death of a partner. The changing into a corporate
form enables the administrator or executor to divide the property in
question by the sale of stock. The death of one partner of a twopartner partnership will destroy a going concern while an incorporation will keep the company intact.
If a corporation is desired over a partnership, for any reason, the
Internal Revenue Code has expressly provided for non-recognition of
loss or gain on the transfer of property by a partnership to a corporation in return for stock or securities. The failure to comply with Sec-
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tion 112 (b) (5) of the Internal Revenue Code can result in the obligation for payment of a large tax on recognized gain on the part of the
transferors. The failure on the part of the advising attorney to draw
a tax-exempt agreement of incorporation for the partners will undoubtly result in the loss of a valuable client as well as cause irreparable damage to the reputation of the attorney.
What are the requirements for compliance with Section 112 (b) (5)?
This section requires: (1) The transfer must be solely for "stock or
securities". (2) The transferors must be in control of the corporation immediately after the transfer. "Control" is specifically defined
in Section 112 (h) to mean the ownership of eighty per cent of the
combined voting power of all classes of stock and eighty per cent of
the total number of shares of all other classes of stock. (3) The stock
and securities received by each transferor must be substantially in
proportion to his interest in the property prior to the exchange.
Suppose that A and B were partners. A had a 63.4% interest in
the partnership assets and B had a 36.6% interest in the partnership
assets. A received a 39% interest in partnership profits while B received 61% of the interest in partnership profits. Upon incorporating,
the corporation issued common stock, a first preferred, and a second
preferred stock. Each of the partners receive a percentage of each
class equal to his interest in the assets. The common stock represented
about fifty-seven per cent of the capital of the company and the preferred stock the balance.
Some time prior to the incorporation, and during the negotiations
immediately preceding it, B insisted that he be given sufficient stock
in the contemplated corporation to assure his receiving a share of the
corporation profits which he had been receiving under partnership
agreement. A agreed to transfer to B from the stock which he was
to receive a number of shares which would, in general, accomplish the
desired result. Nine days after incorporation, A transferred to B a
number of common shares which would give him a sixty-one per cent
interest in the common stock. After this transfer, the common stock
was divided in accordance with their shares in the profits. The preferred stock was in accordance with their interest in the assets.
Does the transaction comply with Section 112 (b) (5)?
In all probability the case does comply with the Code and no gain
will be realized. A. and B transferred the partnership's assets for stock
or securities complying with the first requirement. A and B were in
control of the corporation immediately after the transfer, and the stock
and securities received by each transferor was substantially in proportion to his interest in the property prior to the exchange, fulfilling the
second requirement. The only point which might be questioned would
be the transfer of stock nine days after the incorporation. If the plan
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were preconceived, prior to the date of incorporation, it might be sufficient to render the transaction taxable.
Perhaps a safer way to arrange for the sharing of the profits, would
have been for B to receive a higher salary, under contract, a salary
equivalent to the amount of profits he would have received under the
original partnership.
The facts, as outlined in our example are substantially those of
Strouse, Adler Company v. Commissioner,' a memorandum decision
by Judge Kern of the Tax Court, in 1944.
Judge Kern stated that "the theory of the section of the statute
quoted is that ff the interest of the transferors is continued without
material change in the transferee corporation, no gain or loss will be
recognized. Here .the transferor partners were working out an arrangement whereby under the unusual circumstances their interests would
be so continued. Under the peculiar facts of the instant case we are
unable to come to the conclusion urged by petitioners, that the amount
of stock received by each transferor was not substantially proportionate
to his interest in the property prior the exchange". He then added,
"We reach our decision the more readily because the transfer of stock
from Louis (A) to Isaac (B) took place nine days after the transfer
of their interests to petitioner corporation and was pursuant to an
oral understanding between the two brothers which was indefinite as
to method and time of execution, and which was no part of the formal
plan of incorporation leading to the existence of petitioner".
The Strouse, Adler Company case could have escaped litigation on
this point if the parties on incorporation had complied with the spirit
of the law and had not changed their proportionate interests nine days
after incorporation. The stock and securities received by each transferor could have remained substantially in proportion and a contract
agreement for a higher salary to B would have satisfied his demands.
It will be difficult to ascertain what interpretation will be given to
Section 112 (b) (5) in the future. It is certain, however, that with
the great number of partnerships which are at present transferring to
the corporate form, much litigation will be forthcoming. In a very
recent case, In Mather and Company v. Commissioner2 transfer of
property to a corporation in exchange for stock qualified as a nontaxable exchange under Section 112 (b) (5) where the corporation
issued common stock and non-voting preferred stock and assumed
indebtedness of the transferors. The "proportion" requirement was
satisfied when the aggregate value of the stock and debt assumption
received by each transferor was proportionate to the value of the
property transferred by him, even though the, common stock, pre2

C. C. H. Dec. 14015 (M) (1944).
7 Tax Court 165 (1947).
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ferred stock, and debt assumption were acquired in different proportions. The interests were found to be "proportionate" because
there was a maximum discrepancy of three per cent in the percentages
of aggregate gain or loss of the several transferors. This case should
have a far reaching effect in the near future.
F. Gerard Feeney.

PROPOSED RULE CIiANGES FOR THE TAXABILITY OF INCOME OF

CERTAIN TRuSTS.-Certain changes in the regulations concerning the
taxability of income of certain trusts have been proposed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The proposed changes are to be issued
under the authority of Section 62 of the Internal Revenue Code (53
Stat. 32, 26 U. S. C., 62) and will amend regulations 111 (26 CFR,
Part 29) as follows:
Paragraph 1. Section 29.22 (a)-21, added by Treasury Decision
5488, approved December 29, 1945 (26 CFR 29.22 (a)-21), is amended
as follows:
(A) By striking out the last sentence of paragraph (a) of such
section and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "Such factors are
set forth in general in paragraph (b) and in detail in paragraphs (c),
(d) and (e), below."
(B) By striking out the words "subsection (a)", "subsection (c)",
"subsection (d)", and "subsection (e)" wherever they appear in paragraph (b) of such section and inserting in lieu thereof "paragraph (a)",
"paragraph (c)", "paragraph (d)" and paragraph (e)".
(C) By striking out of subparagraph (2) of paragraph (c) of such
section the words: "or spouse living with the grantor," and inserting
in lieu thereof the following: "or spouse (living with the grantor, and
not having a substantial adverse interest in the corpus or income of
the trust)."
(D) By striking out the second undesignated paragraph of paragraph (c) of such section beginning: "Where the grantor's reversionary
interest is to take effect in possession or enjoyment" to and including subdivision (ii) and inserting in lieu thereof the following:
"Where the grantor's reversionary interest is to take effect in possession or enjoyment by reason of some event other than the expiration of
a specific term of years, the trust income is nevertheless attributable
to him if such event is the practical equivalent of the expiration of a
period less than 10 to 15 years, as the case may be. For example, a
grantor is taxable on the income of a trust if the corpus is to return
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to him or his estate on the graduation from college or prior death of
his son, who is 18 years of age at the date of the transfer in trust.
Trust income is, however, not attributable to the grantor where such
reversionary interest is to take effect in possession or enjoyment at
the death of the person or persons to whom the income is payable".
(E) By striking out the second sentence of the first undesignated
paragraph of paragraph (d) of such section and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "The grantor is not taxable, however, if the power,
whether exercisable with respect to corpus or income, may only affect
the beneficial enjoyment of the income for a period commencing 10
years from the date of the transfer (or 15 years where any power of
administration specified in paragraph (c) of this section is exercisable
solely by the grantor, or spouse living with the grantor and not having
a substantial adverse interest; or both, whether or not as trustee)."
(F) By striking out the last sentence of the first undesignated paragraph of paragraph (d) of such section and inserting in lieu thereof
the following: "Where the income affected by the power is for a
period beginning by reason of some event other than the expiration of a
specific term of years, the grantor will be taxable if such event is the
practical equivalent of the expiration of a period less than 10 or 15
years, as the case may be, in accordance with the criteria stated in
paragraph (c) of this section."
(G) By striking out exception (3) of paragraph (d) of such section and inserting in lieu thereof the following:
"(3) A power which merely enables the grantor or another person:
"(i) To distribute or apply income to or for a current income beneficiary or to accumulate such income for him, provided that any accumulated income must ultimately be payable to the beneficiary from
whom distribution or application is withheld or to his estate, or, if
payable upon the complete termination of the trust or in conjunction
with a distribution of corpus which distribution is augmented by such
accumulated income, is ultimately payable to current income beneficiaries in shares which have been irrevocably specified in the trust
instrument. Accumulated income shall be considered so payable although it is provided that if any beneficiary does not survive the date of
distribution, the share of such deceased beneficiary is to be paid to one
or more designated alternate takers, other than the grantor or the
grantor's estate, if such date may reasonably be expected to occur
within the beneficiary's lifetime and if the share of such alternate taker
or the shares of such alternate takers have been irrevocably specified
in the trust instrument; or
"(ii) Only during the minority of a current income beneficiary to
distribute or apply income to or for such beneficiary or to accumulate
and add such income to corpus.
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(H) By striking out of exception (4) of paragraph (d) of such
section the phrase: "For the requirements of such standard, see exception (5);" and inserting in lieu thereof the following:
"(5) A power to apportion income (whether by distribution or accumulation) to or within a class of beneficiaries, or a power to pay out
corpus to or for a-current income beneficiary, if such power is exercisable by a trustee or trustees, none of whom is the grantor or
spouse living with the grantor, and its exercise is not subject to the
approval or consent of any person other than such trustee or trustees.
However, if any of such trustees is the father, mother, issue, brother,
sister, or employee of the grantor (or is an employee of a corporation
in which the grantor is an executive or the stockholdings of the grantor
and the trust are significant from the viewpoint of voting control), and
if the class of beneficiaries designated to receive the income includes
the wife or any child of the grantor, this exception shall apply only
if the power is limited by some reasonably definite external standard.For the requirements of a reasonably definite external standard, see
exception (4). A power to appoint within a class of beneficiaries does
not fall within this exception if the trustee is enabled to add to or
eliminate from the class of beneficiaries designated to receive the income except insofar as provision may be made for after-born children".
(J) By striking out paragraph (e) of such section in its entirety
and inserting in lieu thereof the following:
"(e) Administrative control. Income of a trust, whatever its duration, is taxable to the grantor where, under the terms of the trust or
the circumstances attendant on its operation, administrative control is
exercisable primarily for the benefit of the grantor rather than the
beneficiaries of the trust. Administrative control is exercisable primarily for the benefit of the grantor where:
"(1) A power exercisable by the grantor, or any person not having
a substantial adverse interest in its exercise, or both, whether or not
in the capacity of trustee, enables the grantor or any person to purchase, exchange or otherwise deal with or dispose of the corpus or the
income therefrom for less than an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth; or
"(2) A power exercisable by the grantor, or any person not
a substantial adverse interest in its exercise, or both, whether
in the capacity of trustee, enables the grantor to borrow the
or income, directly or indirectly, without adequate security
terest; or

having
or not
corpus
or in-

"(3) The grantor has directly or indirectly borrowed the corpus or
income and has not completely repaid the loan, including any interest,
before the beginning of the taxable year; or
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"(4) Any one of the following powers of administration over the
trust corpus or income is exercisable by any person in a nonfiduciary
capacity: A power to vote or direct the voting of stock or other securities, a power to control the investments or reinvestments or by vetoing
proposed investments or reinvestments, a power to reacquire the trust
corpus by substiuting other property of an equivalent value, and a
power which enables the grantor to borrow the corpus or income with
adequate security and interests".
If a power is exercisable by a person as trustee, it is presumed that
the power is exercisable in a fiduciary capacity primarily in the interests
of the beneficiaries. Such presumption may be rebutted only by clear
and convincing proof that the power is not exercisable primarily in the
interests of the beneficiaries. If a power is not exercisable by a person as trustee, the determination of whether such power is exercisable
in a fiduciary or a nonfiduciary capacity depends on all the terms of the
trust and the circumstances surrounding its creation and administration.
For example, where the trust corpus consists of diversified stocks or
securities of corporations the stock of which is not closely held and
in which the holdings of the trust, either by themselves or in conjunction with the holdings of the grantor, are of no significance from the
viewpoint of voting control, a power with respect to such stocks or
securities held by a person who is not a trusteewill be regarded as
exercisable in a fiduciary capacity primarily in the interests of the
beneficiaries.
The mere fact that a power exercisable by the trustee is described
in broad language does not indicate that the trustee is authorized to
purchase, exchange, or otherwise deal with or dispose of the trust
property or income for less than an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth. On the other hand, such authority may be
indicated by the actual administration of the trust.
Paragraph 2. Section 29.22 (a)-21 (26 CFR 29.22 (a)-21) as
amended shall be applicable to taxable years beginning after December
31, 1945.
The publication of these proposed rule changes was made in the
FEDEFAL REGISE in the issue of January 28, 1947, Volume 12,
Number 19. The FEDERAL REGISTER is published by The National

Archives of the United States through the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C.
James D. Sullivan.

